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In 1996, Congress passed and the President signed the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)' and the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),2 which seek to curtail judicial
review of final orders of deportation for legal permanent residents convicted
of certain enumerated criminal offenses. The acts threaten to entrust the
deportation process from beginning to end to the executive branch without any
opportunity for judicial review,' notwithstanding the practical5 and symbolic 6
importance of judicial review in this context. The acts thus raise jurisdictional
issues of great importance, and they portend a sea change in immigration law
that endangers the judiciary's role in safeguarding the rights of all individuals.
As a consequence of the acts, courts arguably may be foreclosed from
reviewing a range of legal questions, including whether the acts' elimination
1. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8. 15. 18. 22, 28. 40,
42, & 50 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1997)).
2. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8. 18, & 42
U.S.C.A.).
3. See AEDPA § 440(a), 110 Stat. at 1276-77 ("Any final order of deportation against an alien who
is deportable by reason of having committed [certain cnmes] .... shall not be subject to review by any
court.") (amending 8 U.S.C. § I 105a(a)(10) (1994) (repealed 1996)): IIRIRA § 306(a). 110 Stat. at 3009-
607 (codified at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a)(2)(C)) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall
have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against any alien who is removable by reason of
having committed [certain] criminal offensels] ...."); id., 110 Stat. at 3009-612 (codified at 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1252(g)) ("[N]otwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have junsdiction to hear any
cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this Act."); see
also IIRIRA § 306(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-612 (repealing 8 U.S.C. § 1105a). The relevant provisions of the
AEDPA and the IIRIRA raise identical jurisdictional issues and, unless otherwise noted, will be treated
interchangeably in this Note.
4. The federal government, however, has not yet argued that the acts eliminate all review, and it
concedes that the acts allow for review of "substantial constitutional" claims. See Ramallo v. Reno, 114
F.3d 1210, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Mojica v. Reno, 970 F Supp. 130. 157 (ED.N.Y. 1997)
5. See Peter H. Schuck & Theodore Hsien Wang. Continuity and Change: Patrerns of Immigration
Litigation in the Courts, 1979-1990, 45 STAN. L. REv. 115, 167 (1992) (observing that. from 1989-1990.
aliens succeeded in roughly 28% of cases in which they sought judicial review of final orders of
deportation or exclusion); Anthony Lewis, The Rest Is Silence, N.Y. TmuES, Nov I1, 1996. at AI5
(attacking the elimination of judicial review in asylum proceedings and emphasizing the value of judicial
review to correct administrative errors).
6. See Frank H. Wu, The Limits of Borders: A Moderate Proposal for Immigranon Reform. STAN. L.
& POL'Y REv., Summer 1996, at 35, 51 (noting the "important cultural meaning" of providing judicial
review of immigration decisions).
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of waivers of deportation under section 212(c) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA)7 for aliens convicted of certain criminal offenses8
applies retroactively.9 Prior to 1996, aliens found deportable could apply for
relief pursuant to section 212(c) of the INA, under which immigration judges
took into account a variety of favorable elements in determining whether to
grant a waiver of deportation.' 0 The retroactive elimination of section 212(c)
relief would not only ensnare aliens convicted of minor crimes," but it would
also negate their ties to, and accomplishments in, the United States.
2
Moreover, while the jurisdictional provisions of the AEDPA target criminal
aliens, numerous provisions of the IIRIRA apply to noncriminal aliens. Several
district courts have already found that the ITRIRA narrows judicial review of
the INS's denial of a noncriminal alien's attempt to stay deportation pending
a motion to reconsider his deportation order.' 3 In addition, the IIRIRA seeks
to eliminate judicial review over all denials of discretionary relief except
asylum, 4 including denials of suspensions of deportation based on the alien's
7. Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(c), 66 Stat. 163, 187 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c));
see also Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that section 212(c) relief is available
in deportation as well as exclusion proceedings). The IIRIRA eliminated section 212(c) relief and replaced
it with "cancellation of removal." IIRIRA § 304(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-594 to -596 (codified at 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1229b).
8. The AEDPA bars section 212(c) relief to those convicted of: (1) an aggravated felony; (2) a
controlled substance violation; (3) a firearm offense; (4) one of various "miscellaneous crimes"; or (5) two
or more crimes involving "moral turpitude." AEDPA § 440(d), 110 Stat. at 1277 (amending 8 U.S.C. §
1182(c) (repealed 1996)).
9. In In re Soriano, No. A39186067, 1996 WL 426888 (B.I.A. June 27, 1996), the Attorney General
vacated an earlier decision by the Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA) not to apply section 440(d) of the
AEDPA retroactively to pending section 212(c) applications, and held instead that section 440(d) applies
retroactively to pending applications. See In re Soriano, No. 3289, Op. Att'y Gen. (Feb. 21, 1997).
10. Among the favorable elements considered by an immigration judge under section 212(c) were:
family ties and duration of residence within the United States; evidence of hardship to the individual and
family in the event of deportation; history of employment; service in the armed forces; service in the
community; and other evidence attesting to an individual's good character and likelihood of future
contributions to American society. See In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584-85 (B.I.A. 1978).
11. See Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that the retroactive application
of the AEDPA would require deportation of a legal permanent resident convicted of two misdemeanor
offenses such as evading the fare on the New York City transportation system).
12. See Katherine Brady & Dan Kesselbrenner Recent Developments in the Immigration Consequences
of Crimes, IMMIGR. NEWSL. (National Immigration Project of the Nat'l Lawyers Guild, Inc., Boston), Feb.
1997, at 3, 4 (arguing that the retroactive application of the AEDPA's elimination of section 212(c) relief
"is a serious blow to long-term permanent residents who make significant contributions to life in the United
States and have deep roots in this country"); Mirta Ojito, Old Crime Returns To Haunt an Immigrant, N.Y.
TiMES, Oct. 15, 1997, at B I (discussing the threatened deportation of a legal permanent resident convicted
of statutory rape in 1974 for having sex with his 15-year-old girlfriend, and noting the dismay of the
defendant's wife and children and the family of his onetime girlfriend about his threatened deportation).
13. See, e.g., Moore v. District Dir., INS, 956 F. Supp. 878, 882 (D. Neb. 1997) (holding that the 1996
acts limit the scope of review over stays of deportation to instances where a petitioner "'can identify a
grave constitutional error or a fundamental miscarriage ofjustice in [her] deportation proceedings' (quoting
Powell v. Jennifer, 937 F. Supp. 1245, 1252-53 (E.D. Mich. 1996))); see also Charan v. Schiltgcn, No.
C96-3061 FMS, 1997 WL 135938, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1997) (holding that the IIRIRA narrowly
circumscribes the court's jurisdiction to review stays of deportation), amended 1997 WL 168495 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 31, 1997) (holding that the IIRIRA was not effective until April I, 1997).
14. See infra note 242 and accompanying text.
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continuous physical presence in the United States, his good moral character,
and the degree of hardship that would result from deportation.'
As an initial matter, courts have addressed whether the acts eliminate all
statutory jurisdiction over final orders of deportation. In the first wave of
cases, courts of appeals unanimously held that the AEDPA eliminated their
jurisdiction to review deportation orders directly under the preexisting petition-
for-review scheme established by the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1961.6 Several courts emphasized that the AEDPA did not raise a
constitutional issue because other avenues of review remained available, 7
while other courts did not address the constitutional issues raised by the
Act.'8
Subsequently, numerous legal permanent residents sought judicial review
of their deportation orders by filing habeas actions in federal district courts.'9
The district courts have adopted a two-step inquiry. First, they determine
whether, as a matter of statutory construction, the acts eliminated or narrowed
the scope of review under the general habeas statute of 28 U.S.C. § 2241.20
15. See Pilch v. INS, 129 F3d 969 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the IIRIRA climinates judicial review
over discretionary denials of suspensions of deportation). But see Kalaw v. INS. 133 F3d 1147. 1150-52
(9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the IIRIRA does not eliminate judicial review over nondiscretionary
determinations of eligibility for suspension of deportation, and declining to address the scope of habeas
corpus review); Tefel v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 608, 614 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (suggesting that interpreting the
IIRIRA to bar all judicial review over denials of suspensions of deportation would "raise serious
constitutional issues").
16. See, e.g., Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785 (lst Cir. 1996). In 1961. Congress enabled aliens to
challenge deportation orders by a "petition for review" directly to a court of appeals. Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 106(a), 75 Stat. 650, 651 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § l105a
(1994) (repealed 1996)); see also Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217. 224-25 (1963) (stating that the intent of the
1961 act was to streamline the deportation process by vesting review in courts of appeals). This replaced
the procedure established by the 1952 Immigration Act, which enabled aliens to challenge deportation
orders through an action for declaratory relief under the Administrative Procedure Act. See Shaughnessy
v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51-52 (1955). Prior to 1952, the sole procedure for challenging deportation orders
was by a habeas corpus action in district court. See Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 158 (citing He kkila v. Barber,
345 U.S. 229, 235 (1953)).
17. See Kolster, 101 F.3d at 786 ("[A]t least the habeas review provided by the Constitution remains
available .... ); Salazar-Haro v. INS, 95 F.3d 309, 311 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[W]e do not foreclose judicial
review of all claims by aliens arising in the course of deportation proceedings."). cert. denied. 117 S. Ct.
1842 (1997). One court of appeals denied, in dicta, that habeas jurisdiction remained under the general
habeas statute of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994). See Yang v. INS. 109 F3d 1185. 1195-96 (7th Cir. 1997). cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 624 (1997). The Seventh Circuit. however, has since retreated from the view expressed
in Yang. See, e.g., Turkhan v. INS, 123 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the AEDPA did not
foreclose judicial review under either § 2241 or the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution).
18. See, e.g., Duldulao v. INS, 90 F.3d 396. 400 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996) (leaving open the "availability
and scope of collateral habeas review"); Mendez-Rosas v. INS. 87 F.3d 672. 675-76 (5th Cir. 1996).
19. Although most challenges to deportation orders were brought directly before the courts of appeals
after Congress established the petition-for-review scheme in 1961, see supra note 16. aliens could still seek
review in district court under the general habeas statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 2241; Orozco v. INS. 911 F.2d
539, 541 (11th Cir. 1990) ("Challenges to deportation proceedings are cognizable under 28 U.S.C. §
2241."). But see Daneshvar v. Chauvin, 644 F.2d 1248. 1251 (8th Cir. 1981) (limiting habeas corpus to
review the "denial of discretionary relief where deportability itself is not an issue").
20. Section 2241 is the general grant of habeas jurisdiction to federal courts and provides jurisdiction
to consider petitions claiming that an individual is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws ...
of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). or -'in custody under or by color of the authority of the
United States," id. § 2241(c)(1).
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If so, they then determine whether the acts violate the Suspension Clause of
the U.S. Constitution, which provides that "[t]he privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require it."21
Virtually all courts have held that they retain habeas jurisdiction under the
general habeas statute,22 but have disagreed as to whether the acts altered the
scope of review.' Courts that have construed the AEDPA and the IIRIRA as
narrowing their jurisdiction under § 2241 have nonetheless upheld the acts on
the ground that they "preserve[] the balance between the Suspension Clause
and Congress's plenary authority to control immigration. 2 4 For example, in
Mbiya v. INS,25 the district court defined the scope of review of deportation
orders required by the Constitution by balancing the requirements of the
Suspension Clause and Congress's plenary authority to control immigration.26
The Mbiya court adopted this balancing test, however; without providing either
a satisfactory explanation for or a discussion of the writ, other than as a
generic limitation on Congress's otherwise plenary power over immigration.
First, the court relied on a statement by the Supreme Court in Heikkila v.
Barber27 for the proposition that habeas review of deportation orders "'has
always been limited to the enforcement of due process requirements.""'2 The
Mbiya court, however; misunderstood the Court's statement in Heikkila,29 and
indeed, the case law belies the notion that habeas has ever been limited to
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
22. See, e.g., Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 157, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Yesil v. Reno, 958 F.
Supp. 828, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Duldulao v. Reno, 958 F. Supp. 476, 479-80 (D. Haw. 1997); Eltayeb
v. Ingham, 950 F. Supp. 95, 98-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Mbiya v. INS, 930 F. Supp. 609, 612 (N.D. Ga.
1996). But see Theck v. INS, No. C 96-4668 SI, 1997 WL 37565 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 1997) (dismissing
a habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction).
23. Compate Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 157 ("The court retains subject matter jurisdiction under its
general habeas corpus powers [over constitutional and nonconstitutional claims], which Congress did not
intend to eliminate."), with Mbiya, 930 F. Supp. at 612 (retaining jurisdiction to review only those final
orders of deportation that "would result in a fundamental miscarriage ofjustice"). Other district courts have
said that habeasjurisdiction exists at least over substantial constitutional claims, but have declined to decide
the full scope of review because the petitioner had raised a substantial constitutional claim. See, e.g.,
Ozoanya v. Reno, 968 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1997). Thus far, one court of appeals has decided this issue
on habeas. See Goncalves v. Reno, 1998 WL 236799, at * 16 (1 st Cir. May 15, 1998) (retaining jurisdiction
under section 2241 to review "the pure statutory question" of whether the AEDPA's elimination of section
212(c) waivers applies retroactively).
24. Mbiya, 930 F. Supp. at 612 (interpreting the AEDPA); accoid Eltayeb, 950 F. Supp. at 100.
25. 930 F. Supp. 609.
26. See id. at 612.
27. 345 U.S. 229 (1953).
28. Mbiya, 930 F. Supp. at 612 (quoting Heikkila, 345 U.S. at 235).
29. The Court's reference to "due process" related to the scope of review on habeas of an agency
factual determinations. See Heikkila, 345 U.S. at 236 (differentiating the scope of review required by the
Constitution from the review of factual determinations under the Administrative Procedure Act). Moreove;
Justice Clark, the author of Heikkila, utilized the term "due process" to refer generally to statutory and
regulatory requirements. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congess To Limit the Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1393 n.93 (1953). Justice Clark's use
of the term "due process" in Heikkila should not, therefore, be misconstrued to imply that the Constitution
requires habeas review solely of Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause claims.
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enforcing Fifth Amendment due process requirements in the deportation
context. 3 The court then applied a balancing test similar to that used in
Mathews v. Eldridge3l to determine the scope of the constitutional writ. 2
Weighing the private interest (an individual's right to habeas corpus) against
the government interest (Congress's plenary power over immigration), it
determined that a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" standard should apply
to habeas decisions in immigration.33 The Mbiya court, however failed not
only to include the third element of the Mathews balancing test, the risk of
erroneous decision and probable value of additional procedural safeguards,'
but also to explain why the Suspension Clause should be collapsed into a
balancing test in which the dominant component is the judicially created
plenary power doctrine.
The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Yang v. INS" exemplifies a second
approach taken by courts reviewing the acts. The court relied on past Supreme
Court deportation cases to assert, in dictum, that the Suspension Clause does
not encompass review of discretionary decisions or errors of law in deportation
proceedings.36 The Yang court's use of these cases, however, is both
questionable and misleading. 3" Numerous cases demonstrate that the Supreme
Court has reviewed deportation orders under the Suspension Clause not only
30. Numerous cases reviewed under the 1891 and 1917 acts-wIhich the Heikklca Court said had made
immigration decisions "nonreviewvable to the fullest extent possible under the Constitution," 345 U S at
234-demonstrate review of a range of nonconstitutional claims. See infra notes 38-40 and accompanying
text. Moreover, after Heikkila, the Court exercised habeas review of deportation orders under the 1891 and
1917 acts over claims of statutory construction and denial of discretionary relief See cases cited infra note
39.
31. 424 U.S. 319,334-35 (1976) (establishing a balancing test under a due process analysis that seighs
the private interest affected by the official action; the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through
procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional safeguards; and the government interest.
including the function involved and the physical and administrative burden).
32. See Mbiya, 930 F. Supp. at 612.
33. Id. at 613.
34. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343.
35. 109 F.3d 1185 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 624 (1997). King was part of the first wave of
cases in which courts of appeals reviewed the constitutionality of the 1996 acts on petitions for review% as
opposed to habeas corpus.
36. See id. at 1195. For its position that the Suspension Clause does not extend to discretionary
deportation decisions, the court relied on lbjtauerv Commissioner of Immigration, 373 U S 103 (1927).
and UnitedStates ex reL 7isi v Tod, 264 U.S. 131 (1924). For its position that the Suspension Clause does
not extend to errors of federal law it relied on United States v Cacets, 440 U.S 741 (1979) See Ifing,
109 F.3d at 1195.
Because the case was before the court on a petition for review, there was no need to reach the issue
of the scope of habeas revie, Instead, the court could hae done %%hat ever), other court of appeals had
done: dismiss for lack of jurisdiction without reaching the scope of habeas rev iew. See supra notes 17-18
and accompanyingtext. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit did just that in two subsequent petition-for-revicw cases
under the 1996 acts. See Turkhan v. INS, 123 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 1997); Cho%% v INS, 113 F3d 659.
669-70 (7th Cir. 1997).
37. At most, both ajtauer and 27st stand for the proposition that habeas offers limited review of
factual determinations. See Vajtauer. 373 U.S. at 106; Tist. 264 U S. at 132-33 In fact, in lbitauer, the
Court suggested that only those factual findings supported b) "some evidence" ould not be revicwed 373
U.S. at 106. Caceres, meanwhile, wvas not an immigration case. but rather a determination about the use
of the exclusionary rule in the criminal context. See Cacetes. 440 U S at 754
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for constitutional claims, but also for legal error,38 abuses of discretion, 3
and factual findings not supported by any evidence. n
Although the Supreme Court has recognized Congress's plenary power
over substantive immigration decisions,at it has maintained that this power is
"subject to judicial intervention under the 'paramount law of the
Constitution' ' 42 and that it therefore does not trump the requirements of the
Suspension Clause, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, 3 or the
constitutionally mandated separation of powers." Thus, despite past efforts
by Congress to confer "finality" over administrative deportation orders,"
habeas corpus has always been available to aliens to test the legality of those
orders before an Article 1I court.4
38. See, e.g., Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 390-91 (1947) (rejecting the government's
interpretation of "entry"); Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3, 8-10 (1915) (rejecting the government's broad
interpretation of a public charge exclusion provision).
39. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72, 77-79 (1957) (describing
how in cases decided prior to the Immigration Act of 1952, courts reviewed whether the "correct legal
standards" were applied in determining whether the petitioner was eligible for discretionary relief and then
exercised review over the agency's denial of discretion); United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347
U.S. 260, 268 (1954) (reversing a denial of discretionary relief because the agency had exercised its
discretion in a manner inconsistent with "existing valid regulations").
40. See Vajtauer, 373 U.S. at 106; see also United States ex rel. Kettunen, 79 F.2d 315, 317 (2d Cir.
1935) (requiring more than a mere "scintilla of evidence"); Lisotta v. United States, 3 F.2d 108, 111 (5th
Cir. 1924) (requiring that the order of deportation be supported by "substantial evidence").
While a full discussion of the Suspension Clause deportation cases discussed here and supra notes
38-39 is beyond the scope of this Note, it is at least clear that the Yang dictum is not dispositive.
41. Congress's plenary power to exclude aliens, first recognized in the Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
U.S. 581, 606, 609 (1889), was extended to include the power to deport aliens in Fong Yue 7ing v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893).
42. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952) (quoting Fong Yue ?ing, 149 U.S. at 713). See
generally Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion
and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 863 (1987) (arguing that even plenary power is subject to
constitutional restraints).
43. See, e.g., The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903) (holding that "fundamental
principles that inhere in 'due process of law' cannot be disregarded in deportation proceedings); see also
Note, The Constitutional Requirement of Judicial Review for Administrative Deportation Decisions, I10
HARV. L. REv. 1850, 1867 (1997) (arguing that despite Congress's plenary power over immigration, the
Due Process Clause and Article III require judicial review "at least for all nonfrivolous claims of
unconstitutional action by the executive branch").
44. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940-41 (1983) (stating that Congress's plenary authority over
immigration does not insulate it from judicial scrutiny under the Constitution's separation-of-powers
requirement).
45. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 19(a), 39 Stat. 874, 889 (repealed 1952) (attempting to
make final the Attorney General's decision to deport an alien).
46. See Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953). In Heikkila, the Court observed that in both the 1891
and 1917 Immigration Acts, which governed until 1952, "Congress had intended to make these
administrative [immigration] decisions nonreviewable to the fullest extent possible under the Constitution."
Id. at 234 (emphasis added). Nonetheless, the Court also explained that courts had entertained habeas
petitions during that period to review the legality of deportation and exclusion orders. See id. at 235 ("Now,
as before, [an alien] may attack a deportation order only by habeas corpus."). Given that the courts
continued to review habeas petitions during those years in which review was not authorized by statute, the
Constitution therefore requires some habeas review of deportation orders. See Trevor Morrison, Note,
Removed from the Constitution? Deportable Aliens' Access to Habeas Corpus Under the New Immigration
Legislation, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 697, 701 (1997) ("There has therefore been an implicit
recognition [by the Supreme Court] that access to habeas corpus for review of deportation orders must be
preserved."); see also Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 12 (1908) (Holmes, J.) (stating that, when
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Determining the full scope of review guaranteed by the Suspension Clause
may at first seem a difficult task.47 In part, this is because the existence of
statutory habeas jurisdiction for claims of federal prisoners since the Judiciary
Act of 1789,48 the direct ancestor of § 2241, has obviated the need for the
Supreme Court to engage in a sustained analysis of the constitutional writ. As
a result of this difficulty, this Note returns to first principles to examine the
availability and scope of judicial review guaranteed by the Suspension Clause
to aliens facing deportation. Based on the Court's limited Suspension Clause
jurisprudence and the history of the common law writ, it concludes that the
constitutional writ not only applies to aliens facing deportation, 9 but also
supports a broad scope of review over deportation orders, encompassing both
constitutional and nonconstitutional claims.
Part I examines the Supreme Court's view of the relationship between the
common law writ of habeas corpus and the Suspension Clause. It also
discusses the Court's understanding of the purported common law rule that the
writ serves only to test the jurisdiction of the committing court, ° and the
faced with the illegal exclusion of an alien, "something must be done, and it naturally falls to be done by
the courts"); Lisotta v. United States, 3 F.2d 108, 110 (5th Cir. 1924) (declaring that habeas must be
available to review abuses of power and discretion by administrative officers); T1IOMAS ALFXANDER
ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 857 (2d ed. 1991) (contending that
the "brute requirements of the process of deportation and exclusion" have enabled courts to assume
jurisdiction in the absence of any specific statutory authorization). See generally Judith Resnik. Tiers, 57
S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 874 (1984) ("A premise of the 'Great Writ' is a willingness to look anew.").
47. See ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 46. at 857 n.6 (suggesting that specification of the content
of the constitutional writ "would not be easy").
48. Ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994)).
49. This Note addresses only deportation, not exclusion. Prior to 1996. deportation proceedings, in
which the government sought to expel an alien who had already entered the United States. were
distinguished from exclusion proceedings, in which the goverment sought to exclude an alien who had
not yet entered the country. See generally ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 46, at 308-1I. 476-78
(discussing exclusion and deportation, respectively). The IIRIRA combined exclusion and deportation
proceedings into one forum, known as removal proceedings, as of April I. 1997. See IIRIRA. Pub. L No.
104-208, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-589 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229a (West Supp. 1997))
This Note, however, treats deportation separately, as does all litigation under the 1996 acts.
The Supreme Court has afforded aliens facing deportation---even illegal immigrants--greater
constitutional protection than those facing exclusion. Compare The Japanese Immigrant Case. 189 U.S. 86,
100 (1903) (stating that the "fundamental principles that inhere in 'due process of law'" cannot be
disregarded in deportation proceedings), with Knauff v. Shaughnessy. 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) ("Whatever
the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concered.")
Among aliens facing deportation, the greatest protection has been given to legal permanent residents, the
targets of the judicial review provisions of the 1996 acts under discussion here. While legal permanent
residents facing deportation thus have the strongest claim to a broad scope of judicial review, this Note
does not distinguish between legal permanent residents and illegal immigrants in terms of the scope of
review required by the Suspension Clause.
50. See, e.g., Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 330-31 (1915) (emphasizing the "bare legal review that
seems to have been the limit of judicial authority under the common-law practice, and under the [Habeas
Corpus Act of 1679]"); Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202-03 (1830) ('The judgment of a court
of record whose jurisdiction is final, is as conclusive on all the world as the judgment of this court would
be."); Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners. 76 HARV
L. REV. 441, 466 (1963) (observing the Supreme Court's acceptance of the "black-letter pnnciple of the
common law" that the writ was unavailable to review convictions by a court of competent junsdiction). But
see I JAMES L. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 37-38
(2d ed. 1994) (observing that in most of the federal habeas cases decided under the Judiciary Act of 1789,
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related rule of the incontrovertibility of the truth of the return.5' Part II
demonstrates the common law writ's applicability to noncriminal detentions
generally and to aliens in particular. It then explores the scope of review that
courts exercised in noncriminal habeas cases and cases of summary criminal
convictions at common law. Part III reexamines the 1996 legislation in light
of the common law writ as constitutionalized in the Suspension Clause and
explains why the writ compels a broad scope of review over deportation orders
today.
I. THE SUPREME COURT, THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE,
AND THE COMMON LAW WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
It is well established that the common law history of habeas corpus is
integral to the Suspension Clause. In fact, the writ's importance and use in the
United States predate the Constitution, as the early colonists "laid claim to [the
writ] as one of the rights due them as Englishmen. 52 The Supreme Court first
directly addressed the scope and nature of the writ in Ex parte Bollman.53 In
that case, Chief Justice Marshall unequivocally declared that "for the meaning
of the term habeas corpus, resort may unquestionably be had to the common
law."' Similarly, in more recent cases expanding the range of claims
the Court's review was not limited to jurisdictional claims).
51. Cf. Frank, 237 U.S. at 330-31 (noting that "bare legal review .. seems to have been the limit
of judicial authority [on habeas review] under the common-law practice"); id. (contrasting that with the
more modem practice, as expanded by statute, in which the petitioner testifies as to "the truth of the matter
respecting the causes of his detention, and the court, upon determining the actual facts, is to dispose of the
party as law and justice require" (internal quotation omitted)). At common law, "no one can in any Case
controvert the Truth of the [facts of the] Return to Habeas Corpus, or plead or suggest any Matter
repugnant to it." 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 113 (Garland Publ'g,
Inc. 1978) (1721). When a court issued a writ of habeas corpus, the person having custody of the detainee
was required to produce before the reviewing court the cause of commitment and, depending on the
circumstances, the body itself. The production of the cause of commitment, along with the body in
appropriate cases, by the person having custody of the detainee-normally the jailer-was known as "the
return." See generally WILLIAM S. CHURCH, A TREATISE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 186-262 (San
Francisco, Bancroft-Whitney Co. 2d ed. 1893) (discussing the common law procedure governing the return
to a writ of habeas corpus).
52. LARRY W. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES 13 (1981).
53. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
54. Id. at 93-94; see also Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 201-02 (stating that to interpret the writ of
habeas corpus provided in the Constitution, it is necessary to "inquir(e] into [the writ's] use, according to
that law which is in so considerable degree incorporated into our own").
In Bollman, Marshall also suggested that the writ's existence was wholly a function of statute and
that federal courts possessed no common law authority to issue the writ. See 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 93. To
avoid the implication of a de facto suspension of the writ through nonauthorization, however, Marshall said
that the habeas jurisdiction provided by section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 demonstrated that Congress
"must have felt, with peculiar force, the obligation of providing efficient means by which this great
constitutional privilege should receive life and activity." Id. at 95.
The Court has not spoken directly on whether Congress may eliminate all habeas jurisdiction under
the Suspension Clause. The issue has provoked a lively and wide-ranging debate among scholars. Compare,
e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-5, at 43 n.5 (2d ed. 1988) ("Absent
congressional authorization, federal courts even lack power to issue writs of habeas corpus."), with Francis
Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605, 607 (arguing that congressional
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cognizable on habeas, the Court has looked to the writ's use at common law.55
Thus, although its view of habeas has evolved over time, the Supreme Court
has never wavered from the proposition that the Suspension Clause incorporates
the common law writ of habeas corpus as it existed in 1789.56
The Court has consistently paid homage to the importance and value of
habeas corpus historically;57 nevertheless, it has generally articulated a narrow
view of the writ's scope at common law. Throughout most of the nation's
history, the Court has adhered to the purported common law rules that the truth
of a return to a writ of habeas corpus could not be controverted"8 and that the
writ served only to test the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.59 In essence,
therefore, the Court believed that at common law habeas corpus was not a
means by which to challenge criminal convictions.6°
In the early 1960s, however, the Court's expansive interpretation of habeas
statutes sparked a revision of its view regarding the writ's scope at common
authorization is not essential because the "Constitution's habeas corpus clause is a directive to all superior
courts of record, state as well as federal, to make the habeas privilege routinely available"). See generally
Hart, supra note 29, at 1365 (suggesting that Congress cannot make exceptions to the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction that would "destroy [its] essential role ... in the constitutional plan"). I side with
those scholars who argue that Congress could not eliminate all federal habeas jurisdiction.
55. See, e.g., Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238-40 (1963) (looking to the "common-law usages
and history of habeas corpus" in holding that paroled prisoners meet the "in custody" requirement of the
federal habeas statute).
56. See, e.g., Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 384 (1977) (Burger. CJ.. concumng) ("The sweep of
the Suspension Clause must be measured by reference to the intention of the Framers and their
understanding of what the writ of habeas corpus meant at the time the Constitution was drafted."); United
States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 210 (1952) ("Since [the First] Congress had not defined the term 'habeas
corpus,' resort to the common law was necessary."); Henry J. Friendly. Is Innocence Irrelevant?: Collateral
Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142, 170 (1970) ("It can scarcely be doubted that the
writ protected by the suspension clause is the writ as known to the framers ...."); see also MeCleskcy
v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 477 (1991) (stating that initially the "English common law defined the substantive
scope of the writ," prior to its subsequent expansion by statute).
In fact, the Court has suggested that, at least in the criminal context, the Suspension Clause may
protect a more expansive form of the writ than that which existed in 1789. through statutory enactment and
judicial elaboration of common law principles. See. e.g., Pressley. 430 U.S. at 380 n.13 (suggesting
indirectly that Congress may not be able to "totally repeal all post- 18th century developments in this area
of the law," but declining to address the issue); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 256 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Court could not be "imprisoned by every particular of habeas
corpus as it existed in the late 18th and 19th centuries"); Developments in the Last-Federal Habeas
Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1269 (1970) ("While the framers probably could not have foreseen the
extent to which the writ's function would expand, the history of two centuries of expansion through a
combination of statutory and judicial innovation in England must have led them to understand habeas
corpus as an inherently elastic concept not bound to its 1789 form." (footnote omitted)); see also Felker
v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333, 2239-40 (1996) (assuming. arguendo. that the Suspension Clause refers to the
writ as it exists today, rather than to the more limited form of the writ that existed in 1789).
57. See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680. 697-98 (1993) (O'Connor. J.. concurrng in part and
dissenting in part) (stating that "'[habeas corpus] is today, as it has always been, a fundamental safeguard
against unlawful custody' (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391. 449 (1963) (Harlan, J.. dissenting)));
Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939) ("[T]here is no higher duty than to maintain [the writ of habeas
corpus] unimpaired.").
58. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131. 137-38 (1934) (stating that the English authorities before
1789 showed no instances of the writ's use to overturn criminal convictions).
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law. Writing for the Court in Fay v. Noia,6t Justice Brennan rejected the
notion that "until recently the writ was available only in a very narrow class
of lawless imprisonments. 62 Instead, he argued that habeas extended to the
following: "judicial as well as executive restraints"; 63 inquiries beyond the
"jurisdiction, in a narrow sense, of the committing court"; 64 "persons detained
by order of inferior courts"; 65 and, more generally, "to remedy any kind of
governmental restraint contrary to fundamental law."'  Justice Brennan's
argument rested on a statement in Bacon's Abridgment,67 several contempt
68 abovcases, and, above all, Chief Justice Vaughan's opinion in Bushell's Case.69
Justice Brennan's historical analysis, though, has not withstood the test of
time.70 In an important and influential article written three years after Fay v.
Noia was decided, Dallin Oaks argued that the common law writ provided
neither de novo review of the factual findings of a superior court of record, nor
a means of redressing every kind of "intolerable restraint" or "violation of
fundamental law.' 71 Oaks underscored that the passage from Bushell's Case
from which Justice Brennan derived his "fundamental law" test did not concern
the scope of habeas review, but rather whether the Court of Common Pleas
had the power to issue the writ on behalf of a person imprisoned by another
court where there was no issue of privilege,72 which would have meant that
the petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 3 In
61. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
62. Id. at 402-03; cf. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311 (1963) (discussing the "common law
understanding" of de novo review of factual findings on habeas).
63. Fay, 372 U.S. at 403.
64. Id. at 404.
65. Id. at 403.
66. Id. at 405.
67. See id. ("'[I]f the commitment be against law, as being made by one who had no jurisdiction of
the cause, or for a matter for which by law which no man ought to be punished, the court are [sic] to
discharge him."' (quoting BACON'S ABRIDGMENT B.10 (John Bouvier ed., Philadelphia, T & J.. Johnson
1856) (emphasis added))).
68. See id. at 403 n.l1.
69. 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670). Bushell's Case involved the commitment of a juror for contempt
by the London Court of Sessions on the ground that he and his fellow jurors had acquitted certain
defendants against the weight of the evidence. The Court of Common Pleas deemed the return to the writ
of habeas corpus insufficient and discharged the prisoner. See id. at 1009. Vaughan subsequently stated that,
as a matter of law, jurors could not be held in contempt for finding against the evidence. See id. at 1016.
His decision, however, relied not on the insufficiency of the return, but on the court's power to go behind
the return to review the evidence itself. See id. at 1007 ("[Olur judgment ought to be grounded upon our
own inferences and understandings, and not upon theirs.").
70. See infra text accompanying notes 77-78.
71. Dallin H. Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH. L. REv. 451,457-58,
468 (1966); cf. Fay, 372 U.S. at 449 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (criticizing Justice Brennan's "square rejection
of long-accepted principles governing the nature and scope of the Great Writ").
72. See Oaks, supra note 71, at 463 & n.71 (arguing that this controversy was not settled until the
passage of the Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Car. 2, ch. 2 (Eng.), which gave the Court of Common Pleas
independent jurisdiction to issue the writ in a criminal case). But see Maxwell Cohen, Habeas Corpus Cum
Causa: The Emergence of Modern Writ (pts. I & 2), 18 CAN. B. REv. 10, 179, 181 (1940) (noting the
"wealth of precedents" supporting the decision of the Court of Common Pleas to issue the writ where no
writ of privilege was involved).
73. See Edward Jenks, The Prerogative Writs in English Law, 32 YALE L.J. 523, 525 (1923).
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addition, Oaks challenged Justice Brennan's assertion that at common law "due
process" implied "supervisory review of the acts of judges of superior courts,
or a broad license to 'remedy any kind of governmental restraint contrary to
fundamental law."' 74 Finally, Oaks pointed to Vaughan's own assertion that
the broad power to review the sufficiency of the return applied only to persons
committed for contempt, not to those committed for treason or felony."5
Similarly, the post-Warren Court's shift to a narrower interpretation of
statutory habeas was accompanied by a movement away from Fay's expansive
conception of the common law writ16 and a return to the Court's earlier
position that at common law the writ was not a means by which to challenge
criminal convictions. Justice Brennan's view of the common law writ was
explicitly rejected by three Justices in Schneckloth i. Bustanonte,'7 while the
Court's actual holding in Fay v. Noia has been substantially overruled by a
series of decisions.7
Criticism of Fay v. Noia was not premised on the authority it bestowed on
the common law writ as an interpretive device, but rather on its actual
interpretation of the common law writ in the criminal context. Courts
interpreting the 1996 acts have, nonetheless, posited the same narrow
conception of common law writ habeas in noncriminal deportation cases.79
74. Oaks, supra note 71, at 466 (quoting Fay, 372 U.S. at 405).
75. See id. Oaks cited the following passage in Bushell's Case:
[Ulpon a general commitment for treason or felony, the pnsoner (the cause appeanng) may
press for his tryal .... and upon his indictment and tryal, the particular cause of his
imprisonment must appear, which proving no treason or felony. the pnsoner shall have the
benefit of it. But in this case [involving contempt], though the evidence given were no full nor
manifest evidence against the persons indicted, but such as the jury upon it ought to have
acquitted those indicted, the prisoner shall never have any benefit of it. but must continue in
prison, when remanded, until he hath paid that fine unjustly impos'd on him, which was the
whole end of his imprisonment.
Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1010 (C.P. 1670).
76. The last Supreme Court case to describe a broad scope for common lawv habeas was decided in
1969, the same year Chief Justice Warren retired from the Court. See Hams v. Nelson. 394 U-S 286. 292
(1969) (stating that the "power of inquiry on federal habeas corpus is plenary"). For a narrower view of
the scope of the common law writ, see, for example. Swam %. Pressley. 430 U S 372. 385 (1977) (Burger.
C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), which asserted that "ait common law, the writ
was available to (1) compel adherence to prescribed procedures in advance of tral; (2) to inquire into the
cause of commitment not pursuant to judicial process; and (3) to inquire whether a committing court had
proper jurisdiction"; and Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475. 485 (1973). which stated that habeas was
originally limited to "determining simply whether or not the committing court had been possessed of
jurisdiction."
77. 412 U.S. 218, 253-54 (1973) (Powell, J., joined by Burger. C.J.. and Rehnquist. J. concumng)
78. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 749-50 (1991) (applying the "cause and prejudice'"
standard to a petitioner's failure to appeal a state court judgment); Vainwnght v. Sykes. 433 U S 72. 87
(1977) (applying the "cause and prejudice" standard to a petitioner's failure to object contemporaneously
to the introduction of his confession at trial).
79. See, e.g., Charan v. Schiltgen, No. C 96-3061 FMS. 1997 WL 135938. at *4-5 (N D Cal Mar
18, 1997), modified on other grounds. 1997 WL 168495 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31. 1997) The analysts in Charan
demonstrates the extent to which the writ's use to review criminal convictions has come to dominate the
field of habeas scholarship, as the court relied solely on cnminal cases in its analysis of the wnt's
traditional scope. See id. at *4. Likewise, distmct courts interpreting the 1996 acts ha%e seized on a
"fundamental miscarriage of justice" standard, see supra text accompanying note 33. imported directly from
a line of criminal habeas cases, see, e.g., Murray v. Camer, 477 U.S. 478. 495 (1986) (holding that in an
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Does the history of the Great Writ, the "highest remedy in law, for any
man that is imprisoned,""0 really offer such a limited scope of judicial
review? A searching analysis of the writ's history reveals a more complex
story."' The "black-letter" rule against controverting the return was not a hard-
and-fast rule in all criminal cases, and it did not take into account the broad
scope of review exercised in noncriminal matters, instances of executive
detention, or summary convictions. Even Oaks, a severe critic of the Supreme
Court's use of habeas's history to justify federal post-conviction review of
state court decisions, has recognized the writ's frequent use and the broad
scope of review it provided at common law to challenge noncriminal
confinement.82 As Part H demonstrates, the scope of common law habeas
review of noncriminal confinement was indeed a different matter altogether.
If, as the Court has maintained, constitutional habeas must be defined by
referring to the writ at common law, Congress, however plenary its power over
immigration, cannot gut the writ of its common law core without violating the
Suspension Clause. 3
II. THE AVAILABILITY AND SCOPE OF HABEAS REVIEW AT COMMON LAW
This part first discusses the origins of the writ of habeas corpus.' It then
examines the writ's applicability to noncriminal cases in general and to aliens
in particular. Next, it identifies the five factors that triggered a broad scope of
review on habeas and the actual scope of review exercised at common law.8"
"extraordinary case," in which a constitutional violation is coupled with factual innocence, a court may
grant habeas relief absent a showing of "cause" for the petitioner's procedural default).
80. John Selden's Argument, Proceedings in Parliament Relating to the Liberty of the Subject, 3
Howell's State Trials 59, 95 (1628).
81. See generally Amnon Rubenstein, Habeas Corpus as a Means of Review, 27 MOD. L. REV. 322,
322 (1964) ("The plethora of English decisions on the subject is not very illuminating and attempts at
elucidation are rarely made.").
82. See Oaks, supra note 71, at 454 n.20.
83. Cf United States ex rel. Marcello v. District Dir. of the INS, 634 F.2d 964, 971 (5th Cir. Jan.
1981) ("There can be no doubt that there exists a constitutional core of habeas corpus authority, derived
from the Common Law, guarded by [the Suspension Clause], and proof against congressional or executive
tampering save in the event of invasion or rebellion."); PEER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 68 n.a (3d ed. Supp. 1997) (arguing that the form
of the writ used to challenge executive detention, as opposed to the form used to challenge the detention
of convicted criminal offenders, was likely foremost in the minds of the Framers when they drafted the
Suspension Clause).
84. Unless otherwise indicated, this Note refers to the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum. The
King's Bench developed this form of the writ in the 16th century, "chiefly to protect subjects against
unconstitutional imprisonment by privy councillors and officers of state." J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION
TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 126 (2d ed. 1979). By the late 17th century, particularly after the passage of
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, the writ ad subjiciendum became the primary safeguard against all illegal
detention. See 9 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 117-18 (2d ed. 1938). While the
Act's protections applied only to criminal matters, the common law form of the writ ad subjiciendum was
used to challenge noncriminal confinement. See id. at 119; ROBERT S. WALKER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND
LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS THE WRIT OF LIBERTY 82-83 (1960).
85. For the sake of clarity, this Note uses the terms "at common law," "common law history." and
"common law habeas" to refer to the writ generally-that is, to English cases decided under both the
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A. Origins of Habeas Corpus
Prior to the sixteenth century, habeas corpus was used primarily by the
central courts of the Crown to check the jurisdiction of local courts.8 6 Habeas
corpus enabled the central courts to bring parties to proceedings in inferior
courts before the common law courts, or to release a litigant in one of the
central courts who had been arrested by the process of an inferior court."
Habeas therefore provided a common remedy against the misuse of jurisdiction
by borough courts; 88 it also provided a powerful means by which common
law courts could expand their jurisdiction at the expense of local courts. 9
While this early use of habeas to defeat proceedings in inferior courts was
certainly abused, 9° it nonetheless suggests the writ's most fundamental
attribute: testing the legality of the cause of commitment.9 '
Starting in the sixteenth century, habeas corpus was used to challenge the
validity of imprisonments by rival central courts, such as the Court of
Requests, 92 the Court of Admiralty, 93 and the Court of High Commission.'
In part, this reflected Chief Justice Coke's struggle to transfer the supervision
of both inferior courts and these quasi-judicial conciliar authorities-the
supervision of which was traditionally a royal prerogative-to the King's
Bench.95 Coke's belief in the supremacy of the common law and the
superiority of the common law courts to all the other English courts eventually
various habeas corpus acts and the common law form of the writ. In contrast. "statutory habeas" refers to
cases decided solely under those acts, whereas "common law wnt" refers solely to the nonstatutory,
common law form of the writ.
86. See RJ. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 4-5 (1989).
87. See 9 HOLDswozTm, supra note 84, at 109.
88. See BAKER, supra note 84, at 126.
89. See 9 HoLDswoRi, supra note 84, at 109.
90. See Cohen, supra note 72, at 15 (describing legislation intended to curb such abuses).
91. See SHARPE, supra note 86, at 5.
92. See, e.g., Humfrey v. Humfrey, 135 Eng. Rep. 291 (C.P. 1572).
93. See, e.g., Hawkeridge's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1404. 1404 (C.P. 1616) (emphasizing the court's
failure to specify elements of the offense or the cause of commitment): Thomlinson's Case, 77 Eng. Rep.
1379, 1379 (C.P. 1604) (emphasizing the court's failure to specify the cause of examination in
interrogatories).
94. See, e.g., Bradstone v. High Comm'n, 80 Eng. Rep. 1138 (K.B. 1613) (holding that the failure to
give alimony to one's wife was not a crime for which the Court of High Commission could fine or
imprison the defendant); Chancey's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1360 (K.B. 1611) (holding that the high
commission could not fine or imprison the defendant for adultery); Roper's Case. 77 Eng. Rep. 1326 (K.B.
1607) (holding that the jurisdiction of the high commissioner did not extend to a debt owed to a vicar).
This high ecclesiastical court was created by statute in 1588 and was given a wide junsdiction to "vindicate
the peace and dignity of the church." 3 WILULAM BLACKSrONE COMMENrARIES "67-68. It was abolished
by statute in 1640. See id. at *68.
95. See EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTTrrEs OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 71
(Garland Publ'g, Inc. 1979) (1644) (claiming that the King's Bench had jurisdiction to correct "errors and
misdemeanors extrajudicial[ly], tending to the breach of the peace, or oppression of the subjects ... or any
other manner of misgovernment"); see also BAKER. supra note 84. at 124-25 (discussing Coke's battle
against royal prerogative); Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Histoncal Jurisprudence: Coke. Selden. Hale,
103 YALE LJ. 1651, 1674 (1994) (noting that Coke fought "stubbornly to limit the king's prerogative
powers and to subject them to the common law and to parliamentary control").
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prevailed, 96 even though Coke-despite his reputation as the greatest lawyer
of his day-was dismissed from the King's Bench in 1616 after refusing to
state that he would stay a suit on the King's order.97
This struggle had an important effect on the development of habeas corpus.
While the writ was ostensibly limited to ensuring that the committing court
had jurisdiction, it in fact ensured that power was exercised in conformity with
controlling statutes and the common law.98 Moreover, as one scholar has
noted, in the battle of superior courts "with these partially judicial, partially
executive bodies, the writ moved yet closer to its role as a safeguard against
the arbitrary power of the Crown itself."99 Though initially used to challenge
prerogative acts by councillors and conciliar courts,"° the writ, somewhat
ironically, would later be associated with the King's effort to provide justice
to any subject deprived of his liberty.' °'
B. Availability of Habeas Corpus To Challenge Noncriminal Confinement
and Its Applicability to Aliens
Despite the long association between habeas corpus and criminal
confinement,'12 the writ was available at common law to challenge a broad
range of noncriminal confinement, both public and private. 3 Although
statutory habeas was not extended to noncriminal detentions until 1816,11
4
it was well established that those confined for noncriminal matters had
96. See Berman, supra note 95, at 1680.
97. See BAKER, supra note 84, at 144-45.
98. See, e.g., Codd v. Turback, 81 Eng. Rep. 94 (K.B. 1615) (releasing a prisoner committed by the
high commission for opprobrious words when the return failed to state what the words were and whether
those words constituted an offense at common law).
99. WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 40 (1980).
100. See BAKER, supra note 84, at 124.
101. See Bourn's Case, 79 Eng. Rep. 465, 465-66 (K.B. 1619) (explaining that it was in the nature
of habeas corpus as a prerogative writ that the "King ought to have an account why any of his subjects are
imprisoned").
102. In part, the link between habeas and criminal confinement is due to the celebrated Habeas Corpus
Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, ch. 2 (Eng.), which had a profound influence in America. See Paschal, supra note
54, at 622 ("The prestige of the 1679 Act was so high that several states enacted almost word-for-word
copies and others almost certainly regarded it as part of their common law.").
103. See, e.g., Goldswain's Case, 96 Eng. Rep. 711 (C.P. 1778) (challenging a sailor's impressment);
R. v. Delaval, 97 Eng. Rep. 913 (K.B. 1763) (challenging the unlawful custody of a child); R. v.
Turlington, 97 Eng. Rep. 741 (K.B. 1761) (challenging a woman's custody in a "private mad-house"); R.
v. Nathan, 93 Eng. Rep. 914 (K.B. 1730) (applying habeas to a commitment by the bankruptcy
commissioners); Lister's Case, 88 Eng. Rep. 17 (K.B. 1721) (applying habeas to a husband's unlawful
detention of his wife); BAKER, supra note 84, at 127 (observing that the writ was not confined to those
facing criminal charges); 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 84, at 119 (noting the increasing use of habeas to
gain relief from private and noncriminal confinement starting in the late 17th century); Cohen, sipra note
72, at 196 (noting that the original purpose of the writ was to challenge civil imprisonments).
104. See Habeas Corpus Act, 1816, 56 Geo. 3, ch. 100 (Eng.). The 1816 Act also abolished the rule
against controverting the return in noncriminal matters, see id. §§ 3-4, except for those "imprisoned for
Debt or by process in any civil Suit," id. § 1. It has been suggested that those committed for criminal
matters also had recourse to the common law writ. See Brief of Professor Paul A. Freund for Respondent
at 30-32, United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952) (No. 23).
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recourse to the common law writ.'05 Indeed, the common law writ had been
used to test the legality of noncriminal custody since at least the early
seventeenth century,'0 6 and courts issued writs of habeas corpus in an array
of noncriminal contexts.'0 7 Moreover, in practice judges applied many of the
procedural protections'" established for criminal cases by the celebrated
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679'09 to noncriminal matters."
Although no exact analog to present immigration procedures existed at the
time, it is clear that aliens could seek review of their confinement through the
common law writ of habeas corpus:
In any matter involving the liberty of the subject the action of the
Crown or its ministers or officials is subject to the supervision and
control of the judges on habeas corpus. The judges owe a duty to
safeguard the liberty of the subject not only to the subjects of the
Crown, but also to all persons within the realm who are under the
protection of the Crown ... and this whether they are alien friends
or alien enemies.'
Indeed, the availability of habeas to aliens is consistent with the overall
increase in aliens' legal rights in England during the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries.' 12
105. See 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 132 (A. Wood Renton ed.. London. Sweet &
Maxwell LD. 1898) ("[T]he Habeas Corpus Act, 1679. applies only to cases of detention or impnsonment
for criminal or supposed criminal offences ... without in any way infringing on the common law
jurisdiction of the Courts or judges." (emphasis added)). Although in noncriminal matters courts continued
to have discretion whether to grant writs of habeas corpus, they "seldom" refused to grant the writ. See
WALKER, supra note 84, at 80.
106. See Cohen, supra note 72, at 35.
107. See cases cited supra note 103.
108. See 9 HOLDSWORrH, supra note 84, at 118 (stating that the Act made the writ the "most effective
weapon yet devised for the protection of the liberty of the subject"). These protections required. inter alia.
a return to the writ within a specified time, delivery by jailers to prisoners of a true copy of the warrant
of commitment, and either a trial for treason or felony at the next sessions or bail. wtth an extension for
only one term allowed to the Crown. See id.; see also SHARPE., supra note 86, at 19 (stating that the 1679
Act was "largely a piecemeal repairing of the common law").
109. 31 Car. 2, ch. 2 (Eng.).
110. For example, even though they were not required to do so by the 1679 Act, judges generally
issued the writ when not in session and made the writ returnable immediately in noncriminal matters. See
9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 84, at 121.
111. 11 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 25 (3d ed. 1955) (footnotes omitted). Simtlarly. Blackstone
described the writ as "efficacious... in all manner of illegal confinement," 3 BLACKTONE. supra note
94, at *131 (emphasis added), while Coke said habeas extended to all detention "contra legem terrae.
against the law of the land," I EDWARD CoKE. THE SECOND PART OF THiE NsTrrrTEs OF THiE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 54 (William S. Hein Co. 1986) (1642 ed.). See also Eisentrager v. Forrestal. 174 F.2d 961. 964-
65 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (referring to the writ's application to aliens at common law): Momson. supra note 46,
at 714 (concluding that the "writ was not subject to pecial limitations when implicating immigration or
foreign relations").
112. See 9 HOLDswORTH, supra note 84, at 94-97. In England. aliens can still challenge their
deportation orders through habeas corpus. See BAKER, supra note 84. at 127-28 (observing that the chief
use of habeas in 20th-century England is to question orders of extradition and deportatton).
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Thus, slaves gained release through the Great Writ," 3 while other non-
Englishmen also gained review via habeas corpus of alleged deprivations of
liberty. 14 Aliens in the United States have likewise been able to challenge
their confinement through habeas corpus since the nation's founding." 5
C. Elements Triggering a Broad Scope of Review on Habeas Corpus
In challenging noncriminal confinement, as well as summary criminal
convictions, the common law writ of habeas corpus was not limited simply to
"jurisdictional" issues, but encompassed legal error, abuses of discretion, and,
at times, factual findings. Indeed, the meaning of "jurisdiction" varied at
common law, depending on the context. Although jurisdictional error was
extremely narrow when it involved collateral review of a superior court
judgment, the concept might have meant something "close[] to full review of
the merits" when it involved review of an inferior court judgment."16 While
there was no precise formula, the writ's scope was always broadest where the
commitment involved one or more of the following five elements: (1) a threat
to the subject's fundamental liberty; (2) the exercise of executive power; (3)
a judgment by an inferior court; (4) no safeguard of jury trial; and (5) the lack
of any other available remedy. I will discuss each in turn.
113. See, e.g., Sommersett's Case, 20 Howell's State Trials I (K.B. 1772) (Mansfield, C.J.) (releasing
on habeas a slave from Africa who had been purchased in Virginia and brought to England, where slavery
was illegal); Knight v. Wedderbum (Sess. 1775-1778) (Scot.) (releasing a slave from Africa on habeas),
reprinted in Sommersett's Case, 20 Howell's State Trials at 1 n.*; see also Shaughnessy v. United States
ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 219 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (referring to Sommersett's Case to
illustrate that habeas corpus extended to aliens at common law).
114. See, e.g., Ex parte Hottentot Venus, 104 Eng. Rep. 344 (K.B. 1810) (entertaining a habeas
petition of a "female native of South Africa" allegedly held in private custody); R. v. Schiever, 97 Eng.
Rep. 551 (K.B. 1759) (reviewing, but denying, the habeas petition of a neutral alien deemed a prisoner of
war because he was captured aboard an enemy French privateer).
Moreover, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, though limited to criminal matters, protected all
inhabitants of England, including nonenemy aliens, from being sent abroad as prisoners without their
consent. The Act provided that no inhabitant of England could be sent as a prisoner abroad, see 31 Car.
2, ch. 2, § 12, except persons contracting, or convicts requesting, to be transported, and those having
committed a capital offense in the place to which they were to be sent, see id. §§ 13, 14, 16. In fact, fear
of being imprisoned overseas was a driving force behind the 1679 Act. See Cohen, supra note 72, at 186.
115. See, e.g., United States v. Villato, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 370, 373 (1797) (granting a habeas petition
and ordering the release of a Spanish citizen accused of high treason). The fact that federal courts were
statutorily authorized to review state custody of aliens 25 years prior to gaining habeas jurisdiction over
citizens in state custody further demonstrates the unique and important role federal courts have played In
reviewing habeas petitions of aliens. Compare Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539, 539-40 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(4) (1994)) (authorizing federal habeas review in cases involving
"subjects or citizens of a foreign State"), with Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385-86
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)) (authorizing federal habeas review in cases of all persons
restrained of their liberty "in violation of the constitution, or any treaty or law of the United States").
116. Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 575, 589 (1993); see also SHARPE,
supra note 86, at 25-26 (discussing the broad scope of jurisdictional review of summary convictions).
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1. Threat to Fundamental Liberty
In noncriminal matters, common law courts were inclined to exercise a
broad scope of review where the confinement presented a threat to the
fundamental liberty of an individual. The broad construction given to a
"fundamental liberty interest" is demonstrated by the range of claims
cognizable on habeas at common law."7 As a prerogative writ, habeas
corpus required an explanation for any deprivation of an individual's
liberty."8 Courts thus recognized that liberty could be endangered not only
by the state, but by private actors as well." 9
2. Exercise of Executive Power
Executive detention implicated the core function of the writ of habeas
corpus, and the writ entered its most important phase when it began to be used
to challenge executive commitments in the late sixteenth century.'20 In
Searche's Case12' and Howel's Case,' the writ was used to challenge the
power of the Privy Council to imprison without cause. In the celebrated
Darnel's Case,123 the writ was issued to challenge King Charles I's
imprisonment of several subjects for refusing to contribute to a forced loan.
Although the return was deemed satisfactory, the case sparked the Petition of
Right, 24 which established the principle that the King could not imprison by
117. See, e.g., Goldswain's Case, 96 Eng. Rep. 711 (C.P. 1778) (reviewing the impressment of a
sailor); Sommersett's Case, 20 Howell's State Trials at 82 (releasing a slave); Heticy v. Boyer, 79 Eng.
Rep. 287 (K.B. 1613) (releasing an individual imprisoned by the Sewers Commission).
118. See, e.g., Bourn's Case, 79 Eng. Rep. 465 (K.B. 1619); see also Codd v. Turback. 81 Eng. Rep.
94, 94 (K.B. 1615) (Coke, CJ.) ("By the law of god, none ought to be imprisoned, but with the cause
expressed in the return of his imprisonment .... ").
119. See, e.g., R. v. Turlington, 97 Eng. Rep. 741 (K.B. 1761) (reviewing factual findings in a case
involving the commitment of a woman to a "private mad-house"); King v. Lee, 83 Eng. Rep. 482 (K.B.
1676) (reviewing factual findings on an application by a wife to determine whether her husband's "ill
usage" and "imprisonment" of her was lawful, but refusing to release the wife).
120. See DUKER, supra note 99, at 40-48; see also Lonchar v. Thomas, 116 S. Ct. 1293, 1298 (1996)
(stating that the common law writ's "most basic purpose [was] avoiding serious abuses of power by a
government, say a king's imprisonment of an individual, without referring the matter to a court" (emphasis
added)); Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 385 (1977) (Burger. CJ.. concumng) (noting that at common
law and at the time of the Framers, the writ was used "to inquire into the cause of commitment not
pursuant to judicial process").
121. 74 Eng. Rep. 65 (C.P. 1587) (discharging a prisoner detained for arresting a surety indirectly
designated by the Queen to receive protection from arrest).
122. 74 Eng. Rep. 66 (C.P. 1587) (releasing a prisoner for insufficient cause stated in the return).
123. 3 Howell's State Trials I (K.B. 1627). One judge called the case "the greatest cause I ever knew
in this court." Id. at 31 (Doderidge, J.). Darnel's Case is also known as the Five Knights Case. See. e.g.,
6 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT 1628: APPENDIXES AND INDEXES 36 (Mary Frear Keeler et al. eds.. 1983).
124. 3 Car., ch. 1 (1627); see also 9 HOLDSWORrH, supra note 84. at 115; WALXER. supra note 84,
at 73 (observing that the Petition "cemented in constitutional theory that no man ought to be deprived of
his liberty without due course of law as administered by the ordinary tribunals of the land," and designated
habeas corpus the "legal instrument" to ensure this "great purpose"). The common law writ also played an
important role in placing further limits on executive power. sparking the Habeas Corpus Act of 1640. 16
Car., ch. 10, § 3, which abolished the Star Chamber and other conciliar courts.
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special command without showing cause. These politico-criminal cases thus
underscore the following points: that any detention required cause or
justification be provided; that the writ's primary purpose had become the
protection of the liberty of individuals; and that the writ played a structural
role in limiting executive power.
These cases, however, do not fully capture the scope of review in more
ordinary cases. Ia5 Moreover, one need not have been detained by a direct
order of the King himself to fall within the meaning of "executive detention."
The courts' review of impressment of sailors by the Admiralty reflected a
"very notorious instance of judicial authority in matters most nearly concerning
the executive."' 126 In these cases, the courts exercised a broad scope of
review on habeas. 27 Similarly, commitments by quasi-executive agencies
such as the Sewers Commission were subject to searching review on habeas
corpus.121 While the birth of the administrative state is a phenomenon of the
late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 129  at common law executive
detentions-even by proto-agencies such as the Admiralty and the Sewers
Commission-triggered a broad scope of review on habeas. 30
3. Judgment of an Inferior Court
The distinction at common law between inferior and superior courts was
an important one, 13' and it significantly influenced the scope of review on
habeas. Superior courts were courts of general jurisdiction, whereas inferior
courts were limited in jurisdiction by area and power to those matters
expressly delegated to them by the document authorizing their establishment
125. See Cohen, supra note 72, at 172 (discussing the narrower scope of review over special
commitments by the King or his Council).
126. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO TIE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 223 (9th ed.
1939).
127. See, e.g., Goldswain's Case, 96 Eng. Rep. 711 (C.P. 1778) (reviewing the facts surrounding a
sailor's impressment).
128. See, e.g., Hetley v. Boyer, 79 Eng. Rep. 287 (K.B. 1613) (invalidating the Sewers Commission's
taxation scheme). See generally GLEN 0. ROBINSON Er AL., THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 46 (4th ed.
1993) (discussing the history of using prerogative writs, such as habeas corpus, to gain review of inferior
officials' acts).
129. See generally ROBINSON Er AL., supra note 128, at 2-10 (contrasting the growth of administrative
agencies in the late 19th century with the small size of the federal government at the founding).
130. See Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 56, at 1238 (observing that
historically, "[w]hile habeas review of a court judgment was limited to the issue of the sentencing court's
jurisdictional competency, an attack on an executive order could raise all issues relating to the legality of
the detention").
131. At common law, superior courts consisted of the House of Lords, the Chancery, the King's
Bench, the Common Pleas, the Exchequer, the Palatine courts, and the Courts of Assize. See 4 STROUD'S
JUDICIAL DICTIONARY 2559 (John S. James ed., 5th ed. 1986). Inferior courts included local courts of
quasi-criminal jurisdiction, such as the London Lord Mayor's Court and the ancient Borough Court of
Record. See id. at 1289-90. Inferior courts also included courts of "special jurisdiction" whose jurisdiction
was limited to particular areas or to redress particular injuries, such as the Commissioners of the Sewers.
See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 94, at *71-85; see also 9 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note I ll,
at 349-50, 576-81 (discussing various courts considered inferior by virtue of their specialized jurisdiction).
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or by legal custom. 32 In addition, superior courts were subject only to the
control of other courts through appeal, whereas inferior courts were subject to
control through the various prerogative writs, such as habeas corpus.'"
Unlike judgments of superior courts, which were largely immune from
habeas review,'3 judgments of inferior courts were subject to searching
review on habeas. In part, this stemmed from the requirement that inferior
courts demonstrate jurisdiction with great detail and specificity.' 3 Because
a superior court did not have to enumerate or specify the causes on which an
imprisonment was based, it provided less opportunity to find fault with the
"cause expressed."'' 36 In contrast, inferior courts had to establish the "full
circumstances and grounds upon which an imprisonment is ordered... in both
the warrant and the return."'137 Therefore, superior courts could not only
ensure that inferior courts acted within their jurisdiction, but they could also
exercise review over nonjurisdictional claims,t"S including errors of law' 39
and, at times, factual findings.'O In fact, great reliance was placed on
superior courts, such as the King's Bench, to review the decisions of inferior
courts. 4' As with their review of executive detention, superior courts' strict
132. See 4 STROUD'S JUDICIAL DICTIONARY, supra note 131. at 2559.
133. Inferior courts could, for example, be compelled to exercise their jurisdiction by mandamus or
could be restrained from doing so by prohibition, and their decisions could be quashed by certiorari. See
I Jowrrr's DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAw 493 (John Burke ed.. 2d ed. 1977).
134. See AMNON RUBENSTEIN, JURISDICTION AND ILLEGALITY 110 (1965); see also W. FORSYTI,
CASES AND OPINIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 451 (London. Stevens & Haynes 1869) (contrasting the
scope of review between "commitments by regular Courts of competent jurisdiction and commitments under
a special authority given by Act of Parliament"); cf BAKER. supra note 84. at 117 (observing that
judgments by the common law courts "could fairly be treated as final and conclusive" in part because those
judgments reflected "tt]he kind of attention now given on appeal").
135. See Peacock v. Bell, 85 Eng. Rep. 84, 87-88 (K.B. 1667) ("INothing shall be intended to be out
of the jurisdiction of a Superior Court, but that which specially appears to be so: and. on the contrary,
nothing shall be intended to be within the jurisdiction of an Inferior Court but that which is so expressly
alleged.").
136. Codd v. Turback, 81 Eng. Rep. 94, 94 (K.B. 1615). quoted in RUBENSTEIN. supra note 134. at
109 n.2; see also SHARPE, supra note 86, at 47.48 (observing that. "as a practical matter, the courts never
allowed habeas corpus to be used as a means of reviewing the decisions of superior courts").
137. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 134, at I11.
138. See Woolhandler, supra note 116, at 589 (observing that superior court review of inferior courts
approached a "full review on the merits"); see also Er pare Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193. 205 (1830)
(Marshall, C.J.) (distinguishing review of superior and inferior court judgments); Oaks. supra note 7 1. at
456-57 (noting that the scope of review of inferior court judgments has always been broader than judgments
of superior courts).
139. See, e.g., R. v. White, 20 Howell's State Trials 1376, 1377 (K-B. 1746) (construing a statutory
exemption in an impressment case); R. v. Nathan, 93 Eng. Rep. 914 (K.B. 1730) (per curtain) (construing
a statute in reviewing a commitment by bankruptcy commissioners); Gardener's Case. 78 Eng. Rep. 1048
(K-B. 1600) (reviewing a claim of statutory construction following a summary conviction by a justice of
the peace).
140. See, e.g., Good's Case, 96 Eng. Rep. 137 (K.B. 1760) (reviewing an impressed sailor's affidavit
stating that he was a ship-carpenter and thus exempt from impressment); see also BAKER. supra note 84.
at 108 (observing that the common law courts closely supervised the Court of Admiralty's judgments).
141. Blackstone described the jurisdiction of the King's Bench as "high and transcendentl[.] ....
keep[ingl all inferior jurisdictions within the bounds of their authority." 3 BLACKMTONE. supra note 94. at
*42.
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control of inferior courts through habeas corpus underscores the writ's
structural role and the reasons underpinning a broad scope of review.
An additional, overlapping distinction was made between courts of record
and other courts. Courts of record were defined by their ability to fine and
imprison for contempt, as well as by the fact that their acts were recorded on
parchment for perpetual memory and testimony. 42 While the superior
common law courts of Westminster were the primary courts of record,
numerous inferior courts, such as justices of the peace,'43 were also courts
of record.144 In contrast, rival jurisdictions of the common law courts, such
as the Admiralty' 45 and the Court of Requests, 146 were not courts of record.
In general, courts of record were subject to narrower review on habeas.' 4
Courts of record that were also inferior courts, however, such as the Sewers
Commission, were still subject to considerable scrutiny.148 Indeed, this
suggests that it was precisely these courts' ability to fine and imprison that
posed a greater threat to the liberty of the subject, thereby implicating the need
for more searching review on habeas corpus.
4. Absence of Trial by Jury
Another, related factor prompting a broad scope of review on habeas was
the absence of a trial by jury. For those facing criminal charges, trial by jury
was historically viewed as the preeminent safeguard of liberty in England. 4
142. See 9 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 111, at 346-48; 1 Jowrrr's DICTIONARY OF
ENGLISH LAW, supra note 133, at 493; see also United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 699-700 (1964)
(emphasizing that the power to fine and imprison for contempt has historically been an inherent power of
all courts of record); 2 THE LAW DICTIONARY Courts (T.E. Tomlins ed., London, Andrew Strahan 1797)
(unpaginated dictionary) (stating that courts of record had the power to hold plea, according to the course
of the common law, in real, personal, and mixed actions, where the debt or damage amounted to 40
shillings or more). Superior courts were always courts of record. See Woolhandler, supra note 116, at 589
n.85.
143. See Pemell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 381 (1974) ("[Justices of the peace] were judges
of record and their courts, courts of record."). But see Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 17 (1899)
(denying that, at least in the United States, justices of the peace have ever been considered courts of
record); see also Margreth Barrett, The Constitutional Right to Jury Trial: A Historical Exception for Small
Monetary Claims, 39 HASnINGS L.J. 125, 157 n.155 (1987) (noting that the distinction between a court of
record and a court not of record has never been precise).
144. See I Jowrrr's DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW, supra note 133, at 493.
145. See I W.S. HOLoswORrt, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 316 (1908) (observing that in the 17th
century the common law courts denied Admiralty its status as a court of record, a status which was restored
by statute during the 19th century).
146. See Barrett, supra note 143, at 157 n.155.
147. See SHARPE, supra note 86, at 48 (discussing the "sanctity" of superior court judgments).
148. For example, the jurisdiction of the Sewers Commission, a court of record, was construed
narrowly and held to the "discretionary coercion of his majesty's court of kings bench." 3 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 94, at *74; see also infra notes 184-193 and accompanying text (discussing other inferior courts
of record).
149. See BAKER, supra note 84, at 416 ("Trial by jury became the palladium of English liberty."); 3
BLACKSTONE, supra note 94, at *379 (calling trial by jury "the glory of the English law"). Trial by jury
was subsequently incorporated into the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, el. 3 ("The Trial
of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury... "'); id. amend. VI ("In all criminal
2528
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Toward the end of the sixteenth century, as habeas corpus emerged as a means
of protecting individual liberty, it became associated with the right to trial by
jury.15 The existence of jury trial as the underlying safeguard affected the
function of habeas review. Thus, in criminal matters, where the petitioner had
a jury trial, habeas tended to play the important but limited function of
compelling adherence to pretrial procedure and the right to a speedy jury
trial.' Indeed, the rule against controverting the truth of the facts stated in
a return to a writ of habeas corpus was predicated on the historic role of juries
as factfinders, whose verdicts judges resisted preempting on habeas' 52
In the area of noncriminal commitments and summary criminal
convictions, however, the defendant lacked the safeguard of jury trial, and
habeas played a different role. In reviewing nonjury proceedings such as
bankruptcy,153  impressment,15 and summary criminal convictions by
justices of the peace, 155 courts exercised a broader scope of review.
5. No Other Available Remedy
Lastly, a petitioner's lack of any other remedy prompted a broad scope of
review on habeas. Thus, courts refused to be bound by the four comers of a
return in impressment cases, where sailors were forcibly taken abroad and out
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed .... ); see also THE FEDERAUST No. 83. at 499
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("Mhe friends and adversaries of the plan of the
convention, if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury ... .).
The Supreme Court has consistently emphasized the fundamental value of trial by jury. See. e.g..
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 (1987) (discussing the Court's "recognition that the inestimable
privilege of trial by jury ... is a vital principle, underlying the whole administration of criminal justice"
(citation omitted)); see also i. (calling the jury the criminal defendant's "fundamental" safeguard against
racial prejudice).
150. See R. v. Whistler, 90 Eng. Rep. 1018, 1018 (K.B. 1702) (Holt, CJ.. dissenting) (explaining the
danger of summary convictions by justices of the peace without the safeguard of trial by jury guaranteed
by the Magna Carta); E. INGERSOLL, THE HISTORY AND LAW OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 1-2
(Philadelphia, T.K. & P.G. Collins 1849) (discussing the link between habeas corpus and the Slagna Cara's
guarantee that no man ought to be imprisoned "against the law of the land"): see also THE FEDERAUST No.
83, at 499 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the link in protecting liberty between habeas corpus and trial
by jury in criminal cases).
151. See 9 HOLDSWoRTH, supra note 84, at 118.
152. See infra text accompanying notes 204-206.
153. See, e.g., R. v. Nathan, 93 Eng. Rep. 914, 914 (K.B. 1730) ("It is very dangerous to let people
depart from the words of the [Bankruptcy] Act, where these special authorities are given."); see also
Crowley's Case, 36 Eng. Rep. 514, 538 (Ch. 1818) (refusing to be bound by the finding of the bankruptcy
commissioners). Though Crowley's Case was decided after the 1816 Act, 56 Gco. 3. ch. 100. § 3. which
allowed the truth of the facts in a return to be controverted, the court did not refer to the Act in discussing
the scope of review on habeas.
154. See, e.g., Goldswain's Case, 96 Eng. Rep. 711, 712 (C.P. 1778) ("1 do not conceive, that either
the Court or the party are concluded by the return of a habeas corpus, but may plead to it any special
matter necessary to regain his liberty.").
155. See, e.g., Gardener's Case, 78 Eng. Rep. 1048 (K.B. 1600) (reviewing a claim of statutory
construction on habeas corpus); BAKER, supra note 84, at 419 (observing that the expanded powers of
summary conviction "infringed the principle that a man should only be judged by his peers. and ... were
regarded with deep suspicion by the superior judges" (emphasis added)).
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of the reach of the King's courts.'56 The threat to liberty did not have to be
so drastic as removal from the Kingdom, however. Commitments for
contempt-even by superior courts-prompted a broad scope of review on
habeas 57 because, absent such review, a prisoner's only recourse was to seek
release from the same court that had committed him. Thus, habeas corpus,
called by Blackstone "the most celebrated writ in the English Law,"'
' 58
involved broader judicial review where it presented the last resort for an
individual facing a loss of liberty.
D. Scope of Habeas Review in Noncriminal Matters and
Summary Criminal Convictions
This section demonstrates that the potentially broad scope of habeas review
in noncriminal matters, as well as summary criminal convictions, encompassed
questions of law, abuses of discretion, and, in some instances, factual findings.
1. Questions of Law
At least in noncriminal cases and summary convictions by inferior courts,
questions of law were reviewable through the common law writ of habeas
corpus. This is demonstrated by the comments of the various leading judges
on a bill proposed in 1758, the practice of "confessing and avoiding" the
return, and the review of legal claims by superior courts in various contexts.
In 1758, the House of Lords rejected a bill that would have both extended
the procedural protections of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 to noncriminal
cases and allowed prisoners to controvert the truth of the facts stated in returns
in noncriminal cases.' 59 It was well established, however, that questions of
law were reviewable on habeas. During debate on the 1758 bill, the House of
156. See Goldswain's Case, 96 Eng. Rep. at 712 (declaring that the court "could not willfully shut (its]
eyes" to the highly sympathetic facts appearing in the sailor's affidavit though absent from the return); see
also Sommersett's Case, 20 Howell's State Trials I, addendum at 1378, 1380 (K.B. 1772) (reprinting a
letter from Sir Michael Foster to Justice Baron Parker, dated May 24, 1758, in which Foster calls the
alternative remedy, an action for a false return, "a rope thrown out to a drowning man, which cannot reach
him, or will not bear his weight"). Notably, it was an impressment case that sparked the proposal of the
1758 bill and thus, indirectly, the judges' discussion about the writ's scope. See INGERSOLL, supra note
150, at 9; SHARPE, supra note 86, at 68.
157. See, e.g., Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1007 (C.P. 1670) (stating that the court's
"judgment ought to be grounded upon [its] own inferences and understandings" and not upon those of the
court that had committed the juror for contempt); see also Hodges v. Humkin, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016
(K.B. 1613) (releasing a prisoner committed by the mayor of his town for contempt for his use of
"undecent speeches"). Commitments for contempt by the houses of Parliament, however, may have
represented an exception to this rule. See, e.g., Earl of Shaftsbury's Case, 86 Eng. Rep. 792, 799-800 (K.B.
1677) (holding that while the return would have been "ill and uncertain" if made by "an ordinary Court
of Justice," judgments of Parliament were not justiciable).
158. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 94, at *129.
159. For the full text of the bill, see 15 PARLIAMENTARY HIsToRY 871-74 (London, T.C. Hansard
1813).
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Lords ordered the judges of the common law courts to provide their opinions
on the proposed law.' 60 Even those judges who denied that the truth of facts
in the return could be controverted conceded that habeas review extended to
questions of law.16' The opinion of Chief Justice Wilmot leaves no doubt on
this issue. Even if, as Wilmot contended, a court was precluded on habeas
from inquiring into whether the cause of confinement was "true or ... false,"
it nonetheless could establish whether the cause was a "good or bad
reason."'162 The writ, Wilmot thus claimed, was not "framed or adapted to
litigating facts," but provided "a summary short way of taking the opinion of
the Court upon a matter of law."'163
Moreover, judges were not confined to the four comers of a return in
determining whether it was sufficient in point of law to justify a given
detention. By "confessing and avoiding" a return to a writ of habeas corpus,
a prisoner could introduce facts that did not contradict those in the return but
that provided an alternative justification for them.' 6' This practice, which has
been compared to the use of special verdicts, 16  enabled courts to review
questions of law on habeas.' 66 In Gardener's Case,'67 for example, a
prisoner, summarily convicted by a justice of the peace'" for carrying a
"hand-gun," confessed and avoided the return to habeas corpus to gain review
over a straight question of law: Was a "dagg" a "hand-gun" as defined by the
controlling statute? 169 The court ruled against the prisoner on that issuei70
but discharged him on the grounds that, as a sheriff, he was exempt from the
act's prohibition against carrying such guns. Similarly, in Swallow v. City of
London, 17  a prisoner, committed for refusing to accept the office of
160. See, e.g., Sir John Eardley Wilmot, Opinion on the Writ of Habeas Corpus. 97 Eng. Rep. 29, 29-
30 (1758).
161. See CHURCH, supra note 51, at 228 n.1 (noting the views of Justices Baron Parker. Baron Smyth.
Baron Adams, Wilmot, and Dennison).
162. Wilmot, supra note 160, at 43.
163. Id. (emphasis added).
164. See 2 HAWKINS, supra note 51, at 113 ("[A] Man may confess and avoid such a Return. by
admitting the Truth of the Matters contained in it, and suggesting others not repugnant, which take off the
effect of them.").
165. See, e.g., King v. Hawkins, 92 Eng. Rep. 849, 849 (K.B. 1715) (Parker. CJ.) ("[As] to the truth
of facts, the return of the officer is the same as a special verdict ...." (emphasis added)). In Hawkins. the
prisoner was convicted for "backbearing and carrying away a deer out of the forest." Id. while the court
refused to review the question of whether the prisoner had obtained the deer owner's consent, it nonetheless
reviewed the legal issue of what constituted a "taking" in this context. Id.
166. The practice might today be compared to a motion for summary judgment, by which a court may
decide a case in which there is no dispute between the parties over any material fact. See FED. R. Civ. P
56.
167. 78 Eng. Rep. 1048 (K.B. 1600).
168. For further description of justices of the peace. see infra notes 184-188 and accompanying text.
169. Gardener's Case, 78 Eng. Rep. at 1048; see also SHARPE, supra note 86. at 67 (citing Gardener's
Case as an example of confessing and avoiding a return). "Dagg" has been defined as a "kind of heavy
pistol or hand-gun." 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 213 (2d ed. 1989).
170. See Gardener's Case, 78 Eng. Rep. at 1048 (holding that a "dagg" was a "hand-gun within the
statute, although... not named therein").
171. 82 Eng. Rep. 1110 (K.B. 1666). see also ROLLIN C. HURD. A TREATISE Os THE RIGHT OF
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alderman to which he had been elected, successfully confessed and avoided the
return by demonstrating that as an officer of the King's mint he was legally
exempt from all city offices.1
72
In numerous noncriminal contexts, review on habeas was not limited
strictly to whether the committing court had acted within its jurisdiction, but
encompassed whether its decision conformed to the governing statute. 73 In
reviewing the commitments of contempt by bankruptcy commissioners, for
example, common law courts adjudicated claims of statutory construction
regarding the meaning, nature, and scope of interrogatories used by the
commission. 74  In discharging one prisoner for the commission's
misconstruction of the statute granting it power to issue interrogatories, Chief
Justice Holt emphasized the principle underpinning judicial review on habeas:
"It is very dangerous to let people depart from the words of the Act, where
these special authorities are given."175  Similarly, in cases involving
malpractice,'76 husbands and wives,'77 and local trade ordinances,
178
courts reviewed nonjurisdictional claims of statutory construction.
Cases involving the impressment of seamen powerfully demonstrate the
reviewability of legal error on habeas. Over the course of four wars fought
against France during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
t71
Parliament enacted a complex statutory scheme regulating the Admiralty's power
PERSONAL LIBERTY, AND ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 265 (Albany, W.C. Little & Co. 2d ed. 1876)
(providing an excerpt in English of Swallow, which was written in Law French). Hawkins cites Swallow
as an example of confessing and avoiding the return. See 2 HAWKINS, supra note 51, at 113.
172. For another example of confessing and avoiding the return to obtain review on a question of law,
see Ex parte Eggington, 118 Eng. Rep. 936, 941 (Q.B. 1853), which held that there could be no arrest on
a privileged day.
173. See SHARPE, supra note 86, at 39 ("What would suffice as a sufficient return was not defined
with precision. Enough had to appear to satisfy the court that the imprisonment was a legal one, and the
court did not have to be stymied by technical rules." (emphasis added)).
174. See, e.g., R. v. Nathan, 93 Eng. Rep. 914 (K.B. 1730) (per curiam) (construing a statute to require
that interrogatories be exhibited and a deponent be given time to answer); Hollingshead's Case, 91 Eng.
Rep. 307 (K.B. 1702) (discharging a prisoner when the bankruptcy commission failed to adhere to the
statute); Bracy's Case, 90 Eng. Rep. 547 (K.B. 1701) (holding that the commission's use of the word
"embezil" in an interrogatory was not within the meaning and intent of the bankruptcy statute). Indeed, the
bankruptcy cases support the notion, suggested in Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1007 (1670), that
commitment for contempt generally led to broad review on habeas. See supra note 157 and accompanying
text.
175. Nathan, 93 Eng. Rep. at 914.
176. See, e.g., Dr. Groenvelt's Case, 91 Eng. Rep. 1038 (K.B. 1702) (holding, as a matter of law, that
the statute granting the power to fine to the College of Physicians did not divest the King of his power to
pardon a fine in the course of pardoning the offense itself); see also Dr. Alphonso's Case, 80 Eng. Rep.
1105 (K.B. 1614) (holding a return insufficient for failure to demonstrate the cause of commitment).
177. See, e.g., Lister's Case, 88 Eng. Rep. 17 (K.B. 1721) (citing the prior execution of a separation
deed); see also The Queen v. Jackson, I Q.B. 671, 677-78 (1891) (reviewing cases).
178. See, e.g., Hutchins v. Player, 124 Eng. Rep. 585, 585-86, 592 (C.P. 1663) (reviewing the validity
of a municipal ordinance, based on a local custom, which regulated the sale of cloth).
179. See generally GERALD J. GOODWIN ET AL., A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES TO 1877, at 92
(2d ed. 1985) (listing the wars England fought against France during this period).
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to impress seamen into military service for the Crown."W In numerous
instances, habeas enabled common law courts to review petitioners' claims that
they were exempt from impressment under a particular act'8 ' or that a statute
granting an exemption was still in force.' 8 2 Although the common law courts
supported the power to impress as an executive prerogative, they "strictly limited
[its exercise] within the bounds prescribed to it by custom or by statute."'183
Likewise, cases reviewing decisions of justices of the peace'gi
demonstrate that questions of law were reviewable on habeas. The justices of
the peace were given broad power over various criminal matters '8 as well
as over the enforcement of an array of economic legislation, making them key
players in the administrative operation of the state in medieval and early
modem England." 6 The breadth of the power of justices of the peace,
however, and their status as inferior courts, made the superior common law
courts eager to supervise their activities through habeas corpus, as well as
through the writ of certiorari'87 and mechanisms of informal control.'88
There are numerous instances of the use of habeas corpus to review orders
of the justices of the peace 8 9 as well as those of other quasi-administrative
officials. A notable example is the review of decisions by the Sewers
Commission, the membership of which traditionally overlapped with that of the
justices of the peace, 19° and which had broad power to order surveys and
180. See I RICHARD GUDE, THE PRACTICE OF THE CROWN SLDE OF THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH
281-88 (London, R. Pheney et al. 1828) (citing statutes and cases).
181. See, e.g., R. v. White, 20 Howell's State Trials 1376. 1377 (K.B. 1746) (discharging a seaman
after determining that he was statutorily exempt from impressment and stressing that he had "no other
remedy").
182. See, e.g., Ex parte Drydon, 101 Eng. Rep. 235 (K.B. 1793) (Kenyon. CI.) (relying on provisions
in several other acts to determine that the statute providing an exemption remained in force, and therefore
discharging the sailor).
183. DICEY, supra note 126, at 223-24; see also Deybel's Case. 106 Eng. Rep. 926. 928 (C.P. 1821)
(discharging a seaman because in impressment cases it "ought ... to appear, on the face of the return, that
the case is brought accurately within the provisions of Act of the Parliament" (emphasis added)). Though
decided after 1816, Deybel's Case makes no reference to the 1816 Act in discussing the scope of review
on habeas.
184. Justices of the peace were generally laymen from the local gentry appointed by the Crown. See
I HOLDSWORTH, supra note 145, at 126.
185. See JOHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 136-42 (1960).
186. See id. at 139-40 (describing the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace over the system of labor
compensation and wage regulation that followed the Black Death of 1348, the maintenance of roads and
waterways, and the regulation of trade).
187. See Woolhandler, supra note 116, at 589 n.86 (discussing the frequency %ith ,hich common law
courts reviewed decisions by justices of the peace and sewers commissioners).
188. Informal control over justices of the peace was exercised through advice given by the justices
of the assize. Again, the goal was to ensure not merely that justices of the peace acted within their
jurisdiction, but also that they interpreted the law correctly. The usual procedure was to adjourn difficult
cases until the next assize and to consult with the judge who would "state[I the rules of law applicable."
EDITH G. HENDERSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ENGUSH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 26 (1963) (emphasis added)
Informal control was also exercised through the issuance of general "resolutions" by royal judges stating
the law in matters concerning justices of the peace. See id. at 27-28 (discussing a resolution concerning
inns).
189. See id. at 95 (citing cases).
190. See id at 28.
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repairs of local infrastructure.' 9' In Hetley v. Boyer,"9 the King's Bench
discharged on a writ of habeas corpus an individual imprisoned for refusing
to release a suit against the Sewers Commission challenging the taxation
system it used to finance projects. In invalidating the Commission's taxation
system, the King's Bench illustrated that habeas protected the liberty of the
subject by ensuring that administrative agencies acted in conformance with
existing law.'93
2. Abuses of Discretion
The concept of "discretion" was not well developed at common law. The
idea that an agency or individual had to act within its delegated authority,
however, suggests that abuses of that discretion, like the interpretation of
statutes, were reviewable on habeas. In invalidating the taxation scheme
established by the sewers commissioners in Hetley v. Boyer, the King's Bench
stated that although the statute granted the commissioners discretion in the
exercise of their functions, such discretion had to be exercised wisely and
according to established legal principles.' 94 Likewise, the courts concluded
with respect to impressment that habeas provided review of the Admiralty's
alleged abuses of discretion on the ground that the Admiralty's considerable
power over such matters should not "be pushed to the extreme."' 95 Similarly,
in cases determining whether a husband's custody of his wife was unlawful,
the issue often turned on whether a husband abused the discretionary power
he had over his wife 196 given her subordinate status as afeme covert.9 7
191. See id. The Commission has been described as a "full-scale 'administrative organ."' Louis L.
Jaffe & Edith G. Henderson, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law: Historical Origins, 72 LAw Q. REV.
345, 349 (1956). See generally HENDERSON, supra note 188, at 28-32 (discussing the origins and
development of the Sewers Commission).
192. 79 Eng. Rep. 287 (K.B. 1613).
193. See HENDERSON, supra note 188, at 7 (noting that such quasi-administrative law cases illustrate
the principle that, in the 17th century, "every question of statutory construction was jurisdictional").
Although judicial review of Sewers Commission decisions declined after Hetley v. Boyer because of strong
opposition by the Privy Council, it resurfaced again a few decades later. See id. at 100. Subsequent review
of decisions by the Sewers Commission, and by justices of the peace generally, was increasingly
accomplished by writ of certiorari, rather than by habeas corpus. See id. at 95. The general shift to
certiorari in the administrative context, however, was not due to the unavailability of habeas, but rather to
the fact that certiorari did not require that the petitioner go first to jail for contempt. See id. at 94-95. One
might draw an analogy to the decline in the use of habeas corpus to review final orders of deportation after
the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 106(a), 75 Stat. 650,
651 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1994) (repealed 1996)), which enabled aliens to challenge deportation
orders directly through a petition for review. See supra note 16.
194. See Hetley, 79 Eng. Rep. at 287.
195. Exparte Boggin, 104 Eng. Rep. 484, 484 n.(a)2 (K.B. 1811).
196. See, e.g., King v. Lee, 83 Eng. Rep. 482 (K.B. 1676); see also BAKER, supra note 84, at 92
(discussing the use of habeas by Chief Justice Coke to override the chancellor's discretionary exercise of
his contempt power).
197. See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 94, at *430 (describing how "the very being or legal existence
of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of
the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs every thing").
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3. Factual Findings
Notwithstanding the rule against controverting the truth of the return,
judges were not entirely precluded from reviewing facts on habeas corpus.'"
Five of the nine judges questioned by the House of Lords on the proposed
1758 bill that would have provided for review of facts in noncriminal cases
categorically denied that they were bound by the facts set forth in the
retum,t99 as did a sixth judge who was absent .2' Lord Mansfield strongly
opposed the bill because he believed the law already permitted what the bill
was trying to accomplish. 2 ' Moreover, even Chief Justice Wilmot and the
remaining judges who supported the rule against controverting the truth of
facts provided in the retum 2 conceded that, in practical terms, questions of
fact could be entertained on habeas.0 3
The main constraint on judicial review of the facts in a return to habeas
corpus was the principle that juries must answer to questions of fact and
judges to questions of law.2°4 Judges who refused to review facts emphasized
the venerable common law rule that habeas corpus would not supplant trial by
jury for the ultimate determination of guilt or innocence in criminal cases.2,
In criminal matters, therefore, such review was generally limited to questions
of pretrial detention. 2°6 In noncriminal matters, however, judges had greater
198. See HURD, supra note 171. at 259 (stating that. at least in noncriminal matters, the "rule" against
controverting the truth of facts in the return was "not, in its absolute form. the law").
199. See id. at 259 (describing opinions of Lord Chief Justice Willes and Justices Noel. Bathurst.
Clive, and Baron Legge).
200. See id. (describing the opinion of Justice Foster).
201. See SHARPE, supra note 86, at 66 n.16.
202. See Wilmot, supra note 160, at 43 ("The Court says. 'Tell the reason why you confine him.' The
Court will determine whether it is a good or bad reason: but not whether it is a true or false one. The
Judges are not competent to this inquiry; it is not their province, but the province of a jury. to determine
it .... ); see also INGERSOLL, supra note 150, at 12-13 (quoting Justice Baron Smythe's view. that judges
were bound by the "facts set forth in the return to the wnt of habeas corpus . [which) can be
controverted or contradicted only by the verdict of a Jury" (emphasis added)).
203. See Wilmot, supra note 160, at 66-67; see also HURD. supra note 171. at 261 (noting wilmot's
practice of indirectly allowing affidavits to contradict the facts stated in the return), cf. 9 HOLDSWOnic.
supra note 84, at 120 (observing that judges "mitigated [the) harshness" of the restriction against
controverting the truth of the return "by adopting the practice of making a rule that a person holding
another in his custody should show cause for his detention, and of discharging such person if no cause wecre
shown").
204. See, e.g., 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 94. at *60 ("If facts are disputed, they arc sent down to be
tried in the country by the neighbors; but the law. ansing upon those facts, is determined by the judges
above .... "); see also supra note 202.
205. See, e.g., Ex pare Beeching. 107 Eng. Rep. 1010 (K.B. 1825) (explaining the refusal of judges
to try a party on affidavits in criminal cases): HURD. supra note 171. at 259-60 (citing judges' refusals to
try the facts averred by affidavits). But see SHARPE, supra note 86. at 65 (arguing that it was because the
writ did not raise factual issues that there was no jurT, and that the absence of a jury did not preclude
consideration of facts).
206. See, e.g., R. v. Greenwood, 93 Eng. Rep. 1086 (K.B. 1739) (accepting affidavits of eight
"credible persons" introduced in a case involving a defendant indicted for highway robbery, but refusing
to release the defendant on bail); Barney's Case. 87 Eng. Rep. 683 (K.B. 1701) (allowing bail for a woman
indicted for petty treason for killing her husband after allowing her to introduce affidavits of fact showing
that it was a malicious prosecution).
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freedom to controvert the facts stated in the return. First, there was no concern
with usurping the historic role of the jury. Second, commitment on criminal
charges implied some previous judicial investigation." 7 Third, noncriminal
commitments by inferior courts had always required greater justification of
jurisdiction than judgments of superior courts. 08 It is not surprising,
therefore, that while the right to controvert the truth of a return in noncriminal
cases was not granted by statute until 1816, the instances in which prisoners
contradicted facts in the return were too numerous to specify.209
ImI. THE COMMON LAW WRIT AND REVIEW OF DEPORTATION ORDERS
Although there is no direct link between the writ's use at common law and
the contemporary deportation context, there are sufficient similarities to make
a persuasive analogy.20 All five factors governing the scope of review of the
common law writ of habeas corpus are present in deportation cases today. This
not only suggests that deportation orders would have been reviewable at
common law,2 ' but also that the scope of review would have been broad,
extending to questions of law, abuses of discretion, and factual findings. Thus,
the proposition that the Constitution requires review only of deportation orders
that would result in "a grave constitutional error,, 212 or in "a fundamental
miscarriage of justice," 213 fails to recognize the applicability and scope of the
common law writ of habeas corpus. Likewise, the suggestion that habeas
review of deportation orders should be "'limited to the enforcement of due
207. See HURD, supra note 171, at 268.
208. See supra Subsection II.C.3.
209. See HURD, supra note 171, at 271. For instances of noncriminal confinement where courts
reviewed facts on habeas, see, for example, R. v. Turlington, 97 Eng. Rep. 741 (K.B. 1761), in which the
court refused to remand a woman to the custody of a "private mad-house" on the basis of doctors'
affidavits and the court's own examination of the woman; and King v. Lee, 83 Eng. Rep. 482, 482 (K.B.
1676), in which the court entertained a factual hearing before ruling on a husband's alleged "ill usage,
imprisonment and danger of [his wife's] life." But see King v. Viner, 84 Eng. Rep. 829 (K.B. 1676) (stating
in a case involving the Mayor of London's custody of another person's ward that the facts stated in a return
to a writ of habeas corpus could not be traversed). In fact, in several impressment cases, the court made
findings of fact to avoid reaching particularly difficult questions of law. See, e.g., Goldswain's Case, 96
Eng. Rep. 711, 712 (C.P. 1778) (reviewing the facts in the sailor's affidavit to avoid ruling on the legality
of Admiralty's general press warrant); Good's Case, 96 Eng. Rep. 137 (K.B. 1760) (accepting the
petitioner's affidavit stating that he was a ship-carpenter and thus entitled to a previously established
exemption to avoid ruling on the legality of another exemption based on the petitioner's status as a
freeholder).
210. See Cohen, supra note 72, at 186 n.133 (discussing the traditional use of the writ to challenge
"commitments by bodies not being courts of law yet having the power to commit," and referring to the
writ's 20th-century use in the immigration context); cf. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238 (1963)
("English courts have long recognized the writ as a proper remedy even though the restraint is something
less than close physical confinement.").
211. Cf Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,450 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (suggesting the traditional applicability
of the writ to aliens facing exclusion in discussing the writ's common law history).
212. E.g., Powell v. Jennifer, 937 F. Supp. 1245, 1252 (E.D. Mich. 1996). Similarly, the government
has contended that the Constitution requires review only of "substantial constitutional" claims. E.g.,
Ramallo v. Reno, 114 F.3d 1210, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
213. E.g., Mbiya v. INS, 930 F. Supp. 609, 612 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
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process requirements' ' 2t 4  ignores the writ's long history of use in
noncriminal cases to gain judicial review over a range of claims.
A. The Presence of the Five Factors
All five factors discussed above are present in the contemporary
immigration context. First, deportation involves fundamental interests "basic
to human liberty and happiness, 2' 5 and thus implicates the writ's highest
function at common law-the safeguarding of personal liberty.
Second, deportation involves executive detention. Immigration judges and
the Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA) are not Article Ell courts, but rather
agencies under the authority of the Attorney General." 6 The important role
of habeas corpus under this scheme is powerfully illustrated by the Attorney
General's decision in In re Soriano.1" Without public notice or hearing, the
Attorney General vacated an earlier BIA decision that had held that the
AEDPA's elimination of section 212(c) relief218 did not apply retroactively
if an alien's application for relief was pending at the time of the Act's
219passage. The Attorney General held that the provision applies retroactively
to pending section 212(c) applications.2z Construing the jurisdictional
provisions of the AEDPA and the IIRIRA to bar review of decisions by the
Attorney General such as in In re Soriano -'- would set the alarming
214. Id. (quoting Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 235 (1954)).
215. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950): see also Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332
U.S. 388, 391 (1947) ("The stakes [of deportation] are indeed high and momentous for the alien who has
acquired his residence here."); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) (emphasizing that the "liberty
of an individual is at stake"); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (stressing that deportation
may "result... in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living"); ALEiN KOFF &
MARTIN, supra note 46, at 854 (comparing the unique and high personal stakes of immigration to other
administrative adjudications).
216. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1994) (providing that a "determination and ruling by the Attorney
General with respect to all questions of [immigration] law shall be controlling"). Until 1973, immigration
judges were known as "special inquiry officers" and served as "trial attorneys" in deportation and exclusion
cases. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 46, at 109. In 1983, immigration judges were moved from the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) into a new unit, the Executive Office of Immigration Review
(EOIR), located in the Department of Justice and directly accountable to the Assistant Attorney General.
See id. The BIA, a multi-member review body appointed by the Attorney General, has never been part of
the INS; instead, it has always been directly accountable to the Attorney General. See td. at 112. While
immigration judges' and the BIA's adjudication in deportation and exclusion cases has grown more
"judicial" over the years, immigration judges and the BIA have been attacked for their lack of
independence. See, e.g., Developments in the Lai%-Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARv.
L. REv. 1286, 1363-66 (1983) (stressing the "'enforcement mentality" in the BIA and the implicit control
of the Attorney General).
217. No. 3289, Op. Att'y Gen. (Feb. 21, 1997).
218. See AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(d). I10 Stat. 1214, 1277 (1996) (amending 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(C) (1994) (repealed 1996)).
219. See In re Soriano, No. A39186067, 1996 WL 426888 (B.I.A. June 27, 1996).
220. See In re Soriano, No. 3289, Op. Att'y Gen.
221. Compare Mayers v. Reno, 977 F. Supp. 1457, 1462-63 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (holding that the court
had no jurisdiction to review the Attorney General's decision), with Mojica v. Reno. 970 F. Supp. 130, 182
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that the court had jurisdiction and reversing the Attorney General's decision on
the merits). Other courts have held that they retained jurisdiction to review the Attorney General's decision.
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precedent of making it the exclusive province of the executive branch to say
what the law is in a matter affecting personal liberty.222 The acts would
thereby denude the common law writ of habeas corpus of its core function as
a safeguard of personal liberty and a check on arbitrary executive power.223
Third, review of deportation orders is akin to the review of decisions of
an inferior court at common law. At common law, inferior courts were subject
to the strict control of superior courts, which exercised a broad scope of review
on habeas. 224 Under the common law definition, both immigration judges and
the BIA qualify as inferior courts because their jurisdiction is specialized and
limited.2  In certain respects, immigration tribunals are like the King's
conciliar courts, the extensive power of which the common law courts sought
to supervise through habeas corpus.226 Indeed, immigration proceedings are
arguably not even judicial in nature.227  Moreover, as Blackstone
228suggests, it was precisely those inferior courts able to impose significant
sanctions z29 that implicated the functional role of habeas and subjected their
decisions to the supervision of superior courts-a function today served in the
immigration context by Article III courts.
Fourth, deportation is noncriminal230 and does not require trial by jury
but have upheld the decision on the merits. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Martinez v. Reno, No.
Civ.A.1:97CV3361TWT, 1998 WL 7459, at *3-5 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 8, 1998).
222. Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) ("The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of
the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable objectives, must
be resisted."); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article I11, 101
HARV. L. REv. 915, 970 (1988) (contending that the "rule of law requires that administrative determinations
of legal rights [of aliens] be open to review and thus to correction by the courts").
223. See supra Subsection II.C.2; see also TIlE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 499 (Alexander Hamilton)
(describing the role of habeas corpus in protecting against "arbitrary methods of prosecuting pretended
offenses," and "arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary convictions" (emphases added)); cf Larry W. Yackle,
Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 991, 997 (1985) ("Properly conceived, the writ is not a
procedural vehicle for the protection of physical liberty ... but an instrument of governmental
administration employed to distribute authority and responsibility between courts of concurrent
jurisdiction.").
224. See supra Subsection II.C.3.
225. See Kempe's Lessee v. Kennedy, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 173, 184, 185 n.l (1809) (Marshall, CJ.)
(defining inferior courts). Importantly, in Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830), Chief Justice
Marshall pointed out that lower federal courts were superior courts even though the Constitution and
statutes limited their jurisdiction. Unlike federal courts, however, administrative agencies do not decide a
wide range of issues, a factor recognized at common law as an attribute of inferior courts. See Woolhandler,
supra note 116, at 589 n.86 (noting that inferior courts had "stinted, limiting jurisdiction" at common law).
Moreover, in contrast to federal courts, administrative agencies generally do not have jurisdiction to decide
the constitutionality of congressional enactments. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 368 (1974).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 92-101.
227. See Nakaranurack v. United States, 68 F.3d 290, 294 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that "neither a ruling
by an [immigration judge] nor a decision of the BIA constitutes a 'judicial proceeding..."' (emphasis
added)).
228. See supra note 148 (noting, for example, review of decisions by the Sewers Commission).
229. Immigration judges were recently given the power to hold parties in contempt. See 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1229a(b)(1) (West Supp. 1997). And while deportation is noncriminal, the Court has described its
consequences as particularly severe. See cases cited supra note 215.
230. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (stating that a "deportation proceeding
is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this country, not to punish an unlawful entry");
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) ("Deportation, however severe its consequences, has
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or other rights required by the Constitution in criminal proceedings.2 " At
common law, the absence of the safeguard of trial by jury triggered a broad
scope of review on habeas.
232
And fifth, because those facing deportation have no other remedy,2" the
common law writ further supports a broad scope of review23
B. The Implications of a Broad Scope of Habeas Review
The 1996 acts offer a glimpse of what a broad scope of habeas review
would entail in the deportation context. Among other important issues,23 the
following legal claim has been raised in challenges to the AEDPA and the
IIRIRA: whether the acts' elimination of waivers of deportation pursuant to
INA section 212(c) for aliens convicted of certain criminal offenses applies
retroactively, regardless of how long ago the crime was committed.2"36 The
issue presents a straight question of law with dramatic implications for
individual personal liberty, 237 the resolution of which requires independent
judicial review. 238 Indeed, the importance of such review is underscored by
the fact that several courts have refused to follow the Attorney General's
decision in In re Soriano, holding that the acts' elimination of section 212(c)
relief does not apply retroactively239 Putting the merits aside, however, the
been consistently classified as a civil rather than a criminal procedure.").
231. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) (holding that the E. Post Facto Clause does not
apply to deportation); Argiz v. INS, 704 F.2d 384, 387 (7th Cir. 1983) (per cunam) (holding that the
Speedy Trial Clause does not apply to deportation).
232. See supra Subsection II.C.4.
233. See Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 399 (1995) (stating that the "conscqucnccsof deportation
are ... final, unlike orders in some other administrati' e contcxts"). \Wbodb) v INS, 385 U S 276, 285
(1966) ("This Court has not closed its eyes to the drastic depn'ations that ma, folloNhen a resident of
this country is compelled by our Government to forsake all the bonds formed here and go to a foreign land
where he often has no contemporary identification.")
234. See supra Subsection II.C.5.
235. See, e.g., Anwar v. INS, 116 F.3d 140. 144 (5th Cir 1997) (holding that the AEDPA did not
eliminate the court's jurisdiction to revie\, the BIA's denial of an alien's motion to reopen his claims for
asylum and withholding of deportation); Kolster v. INS. 101 F 3d 785 (1 st Cir 1996) (dismissing for lack
ofjurisdiction a petition for review claiming that the BIA erred in interpreting section 212(c)'s requirement
of seven years of "lawful unrelinquished domicile" to mean se en years of "Iawful permanent residence').
236. See, e.g., Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). For a discussion of the
favorable elements previously considered in an application for section 212(c) relief, see supra note 10
237. See Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 137 (wvarning that under the Attome) General's interpretation of the
AEDPA in In m Soriano, any person convicted of a minor cnme many years ago "could no%% be picked
up off the streets..., tom from his or her family job or business, and deported" tthout the right to seek
a section 212(c) waiver); see also id. at 178 ("[Tihe right to apply for the Isection 212(c)l waiver has been
a statutory right which has played a central role in decisions made b) criminally accused lawful permanent
residents and other actors in the criminal justice system for decades.").
238. Cf Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpmtation in the AdministrativeState, 133 U PA. L. REV 549,
579-80 (1985) (suggesting as the strongest rationale for judicial reve% that "judges are less likely than
agencies to allow personal bias or self-interest to distort their reading of the enactor's intent")
239. See, e.g., Goncalves v. Reno, 1998 WL 236799. at * 17 (1st Cir. Ma) 15. 1998) (rejecting the
Attorney General's conclusion that the AEDPA's elimination of section 212(c) relief applies retroactively
to pending applications); Motca, 970 F Supp. at 182 (holding that retroactive elimination of section 212(c)
waivers "constitute[s] an arbitrary abuse of power by the Attomey General"). Other district courts have
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Suspension Clause itself requires that an alien facing deportation have the
opportunity to challenge the executive branch's construction of an immigration
statute before a federal court.24
Discretionary decisions play an important role in immigration law, and
numerous commentators have stressed the need for greater judicial review of
such determinations. 241 This is not simply a matter of public policy, however
Fidelity to the common law writ of habeas corpus requires that the exercise of
discretion by an immigration judge be reviewable to ensure that this great
power over individual liberty is not exercised arbitrarily. Thus, a criminal alien
faced with deportation under the AEDPA and the IIRIRA must have the
opportunity for review of his claim of statutory eligibility for section 212(c)
relief as well as the chance to challenge a denial of a waiver on the merits.
Similarly, the IIRIRA cannot be construed as eliminating judicial review over
all discretionary decisions, except asylum, 42 without running afoul of the
Suspension Clause.243
In addition, the Suspension Clause requires at least some review of factual
findings in deportation proceedings. While questions of fact have not arisen in
legal challenges to the jurisdictional provisions of the 1996 acts affecting the
deportation of criminal aliens,244 factual determinations have traditionally
stated that AEDPA section 440(d)'s elimination of section 212(c) waivers applies retroactively, but
nonetheless have held that it violates the Equal Protection Clause to apply section 440(d) to deportable, but
not excludable, legal permanent residents. See Jurado-Gutierrez v. Greene, 977 F. Supp. 1089, 1093 (D.
Colo. 1997); Vargas v. Reno, 966 F. Supp. 1537, 1544-47 (S.D. Cal. 1997).
240. Thus, were the Attorney General to apply the expedited removal provisions of IIRIRA to aliens
allegedly in the United States for two years or less, see infra text accompanying notes 247-248, federal
courts must still exercise habeas jurisdiction over an alien's claim of statutory construction, such as the
criteria necessary to meet the test of two years' continuous residence. See Gail Pendleton, New Removal
Proceedings, IMMIGR. NEWSL. (National Immigration Project of the Nat'l Lawyers Guild, Inc., Boston),
Apr. 1997, at 1, 10 (discussing the ambiguity of the regulations). See generally Lucas Guttentag, The 1996
Immigration Act: Federal Court Jurisdiction-Statutory Restrictions and Constitutional Rights,
INTERPRETER RELEASES (Federal Publications, Wash., D.C.), Feb. 10, 1997, at 245.
241. See, e.g., Michael G. Heyman, Judicial Review of Discretionary Immigration Decisionmaking,
31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 861, 865 (1994) (arguing that the "retreat from meaningful judicial review...
represent[s] an unacceptable insensitivity to the human dimension of [immigration] cases"); Daniel
Kanstroom, Surounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discrttion and Deference in US. Immigration Law,
71 TUL. L. REV. 703 (1997); cf. Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRA/IVE ACTION 375
(1965) ("[T]here are very few discretions, however broad, substantially affecting the person or property of
an individual which cannot at some point come under judicial surveillance." (emphasis omitted)).
242. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1997) (eliminating jurisdiction to review "(i) any
judgment regarding the granting of relief" under INA sections 212(h) (enumerated criminal); 212(i) (fraud
and misrepresentation); 240A (cancellation of removal); 240B (voluntary departure); 245 (adjustment of
status); and "(ii) any other decision... which is ... in the discretion of the Attorney General" except
asylum under section 208(a)); see also Pendleton, supra note 240, at 14 (discussing the IIRIRA's
elimination of federal judicial review over all discretionary determinations except asylum).
243. Cf Tefel v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 608, 614 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (stating that the elimination of judicial
review over the discretionary decision to stay deportation would "raise serious constitutional issues").
244. Criminal aliens facing deportation under the AEDPA and the IIRIRA have not challenged the
underlying criminal convictions for which they are supposedly deportable, but rather have raised legal
challenges to, inter alia: (1) the acts' retroactive application, see, e.g., Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 157; (2)
construction of the acts' jurisdictional bar, see, e.g., Choeum v. INS, 129 F.3d 29, 38-39 (1st Cir. 1997)
(rejecting the INS's interpretation of AEDPA section 440(a)'s use of "deportable by reason of" to preclude
judicial review where the alien was not in fact found deportable for that reason); (3) the effective date of
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been important in determinations of deportability based on economic
criteria245 or ideology.2 6 Moreover, the IIRIRA's new "expedited removal"
provisions, which now govern the admission of aliens to the United States,4 7
could also be applied to aliens who allegedly entered the country illegally in
the past and have lived continuously in the United States for two years or
less.248 The expedited removal provisions preclude virtually all judicial
review 249 and thus could lead to the deportation of aliens based on erroneous
factual findings.' 0 Such a result would flout the core purpose of the common
law writ of habeas corpus.
C. The Irrelevance of Traditional Reasons for Narrowing Habeas Review
Even if maintaining the common law core of habeas corpus were
not, as I argued in Part I, constitutionally compelled, the factors
underpinning the recent decisions by Congress25' and the Supreme
various provisions of the acts, see, e.g., id. at 35-37 (holding that the IIRIRA's revised definition of
"'aggravated felony" did not apply to the petitioner's case), and (4) the interpretation of a preexisting
statutory provision, see, e.g., Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785, 787 (Ist Cir. 1996) (challenging the INS's
interpretation of the provision of section 212(c) that requires seven years of "lawful unrelinquished
domicile").
245. See, e.g., Lisotta v. United States, 3 F.2d 108, 111 (5th Cir. 1924) (holding that there was no
evidence that the alien was likely to become a public charge at the time of hs admission to the country).
246. See, e.g., Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103. 109 (1927) (holding that the
deportation of an alien for advocating opposition to all organized government or the overthrow of the
United States government by force and violence was supported by some evidence): Mahler v. Eby, 264
U.S. 32, 43 (1924) (holding that the deportation order contained no evidence of a finding that the alien was
an "undesirable resident" of the United States).
247. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225 (West Supp. 1997).
248. Although the Attorney General has yet to apply the expedited removal provisions to noncitizens
residing in the United States, it is within her discretion to do so at anytime. See id. § 1225(bXl)(AXiii)l).
249. See id. § 1225(b)(l)(A)(i) (ordering the removal of suspected illegal aliens seeking to enter the
country "without further hearing or review" unless the individual demonstrates to the immigration officer
"an intention to apply for asylum ... or a fear of persecution"). The IIRIRA creates a narrow exception
for review in habeas corpus proceedings. Such review is limited to determining whether the petitioner is
an alien, was ordered removed under the expedited removal provisions, and can prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that he is a legal permanent resident, has been admitted as a refugee, or has been granted
asylum. See id. § 1252(e)(2)(A)-(C).
250. Cf. Inspection & Expedited Removal of Aliens, 62 Fed. Reg. 10.312. 10.313-14 (1997)
(explaining that the application of the expedited removal provisions to those aliens already in the United
States would "involve more complex determinations of fact and will be more difficult to manage" than
applying them to those seeking admission at the border); see also Pendleton. supra note 240. at 10 (arguing
that the regulations provide no guidance on how noncitizens may show two years of continuous physical
presence).
251. The AEDPA amends federal habeas corpus in significant ways. See. e.g.. AEDPA, Pub. L No.
104-132, § 101, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(dX1)-(2) (West Supp. 1997))
(establishing-for the first time ever-a one-year time limitation for filing federal habeas petitions that
begins to run, with limited exceptions, after the state court judgment becomes final); td. § 104. 110 Star.
at 1219 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)) (requiring increased deference to state court judgments on
federal habeas with respect to pure questions of federal law and mixed questions of law and fact); id.. 110
Stat. at 1219 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)) (eliminating exceptions to the presumption of correctness
of factual findings by state courts and narrowing the circumstances in which an evidenuary heanng may
be conducted); id., § 106, 110 Stat. at 1220-21 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(b)) (adding restmctions on
successive habeas petitions); id., § 107, 110 Star. 1221-26 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2261-2266)
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Court252 to narrow the scope and availability of federal habeas in collateral
attacks on criminal convictions do not support restricting review in deportation
cases. Several, often overlapping reasons are given for narrowing the scope and
availability of federal habeas review, including finality,253  comity (or
federalism),'254 and the process-oriented view of legality as fair institutional
process rather than substantively correct outcomes.255
Regardless of their relative merit for limiting collateral review of criminal
convictions, 56  these concerns underscore precisely why deportation
implicates the core purpose of the common law writ and requires a broad
scope of review under the Suspension Clause. Unlike the defendant seeking
habeas review of a criminal conviction, whose conviction has already received
several levels of judicial scrutiny,257 an alien facing deportation has received
no judicial process at all. 58 Providing some judicial review of the executive
(establishing special provisions in capital cases to which individual states may "opt-in"). See generally
Marshall J. Hartman & Jeanette Nyden, Habeas Corpus and the New Federalism After the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 337, 352-86 (1997) (discussing how
the AEDPA amends federal habeas corpus).
252. See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996) (upholding the added restrictions on second
or successive habeas petitions imposed by the AEDPA); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993)
(adopting a less onerous harmless error standard on habeas review); Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S.
1 (1992) (adopting a "cause and prejudice" standard for failure to develop facts at trial); Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (barring the petitioner from raising an ineffective-assistane-of-counsel
claim on habeas on the ground that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction
proceedings); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (applying the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine to
successive habeas petitions absent a showing of "cause and prejudice"); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989) (holding that, with two narrow exceptions, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not
be applied retroactively on habeas to cases that became final before the new rule was announced); Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (barring federal relitigation of a search-and-seizure claim if the defendant
was given a "full and fair" opportunity to litigate the claim in a state proceeding).
For most purposes, these precedents apply equally to state and federal prisoners seeking habeas
review. See Low & JEFFRIES, supra note 83, at 69. Federal review of state convictions may be obtained
through 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994); review of federal convictions proceeds under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which
was enacted in 1948 as an alternative to habeas corpus for federal prisoners and which affords the same
relief. See Low & JEFFRIES, supra note 83, at 69.
253. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 747 (1991) (stating that "the cost to finality in
criminal litigation" is the most significant cost of federal habeas corpus).
254. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 478 n.l1 (citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 425-26 (1963)); see also
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (stressing that the concept of federalism requires "sensitivity
to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments").
255. The most oft-cited argument on this score is that of Professor Paul M. Bator. See Bator, supra
note 50; see also Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 579, 586-90 (1982) (summarizing Professor Bator's view).
256. Compare Bator, supra note 50, at 462 (arguing for restrictive federal habeas review where the
defendant has had a "full and fair" hearing in a state court), with Peller, supra note 255, at 582 (claiming
that "federal habeas review is justified not by an ideal model of federal and state relations, but by the
actual refusal of state courts to vindicate federal rights during various periods of American history").
257. The principle that defendants must first exhaust all remedies provided by the appellate process
before gaining post-conviction habeas review was established in Exparte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886), and
is now codified in federal habeas statutes, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(l)(A)-(B) (1994) (barring habeas
relief to those in custody pursuant to a state court judgment absent exhaustion of state court remedies, or
absent available or effective "[s]tate corrective process").
258. Cf. Lonchar v. Thomas, 116 S. Ct. 1293, 1299 (1996) ("Dismissal of a first federal habeas
petition is a particularly serious matter, for that dismissal denies the petitioner the protections of the Great
Writ entirely, risking injury to an important interest in human liberty.").
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branch's interpretation of statutes governing deportation is quite distinct from
the "endless repetition of inquiry into facts and law in a vain search for
ultimate certitude" that is often associated with collateral review of criminal
convictions, particularly death penalty cases. - 9 In a fundamental sense,
federal habeas review of an administrative deportation order is not collateral
at all.
Federalism-based concerns about habeas are likewise irrelevant because
deportation in no way implicates the integrity of procedures "employed by a
coordinate jurisdiction within the federal system."6 Instead, deportation
involves the review of actions of another branch of the federal government, a
principle well established since Marbury v. Madison. 61
Finally, the process-oriented argument in favor of a narrow understanding
of habeas corpus is also inapplicable in the deportation context. That argument
is premised on the assumption, itself rooted in the context of collateral review
of state convictions, that most petitioners have already received "full and fair"
hearings. 262 The argument quickly falls apart when applied to quasi-judicial
proceedings held under the authority of the executive branch. 63 Like review
of state convictions, such proceedings implicate the special prominence of
federal courts in protecting federal rights.26 In addition, however, they
involve the even more basic right to adjudication by a neutral institution. It is
one thing to restrict habeas corpus when the individual has the right to direct
259. Bator, supra note 50, at 452. The Supreme Court has created a narrow exception to the principle
that successive claims will not be reviewed on habeas absent a showing of cause and prejudice, otherwise
known as the "actual innocence" or "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception. See. e.g., Schlup v.
Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 318-23 (1995) (discussing the development and purpose of the exception); see also
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 345 (1992) (describing the "actual innocence" standard for successive
habeas petitions as a "narrow" exception to the principle of finality). See generally Friendly. supra note
56, at 160 (proposing an exception to the concept of finality where the petitioner has made a "colorable
showing of innocence"). This narrow exception, created in the context of reviewing successive petitions
challenging death sentences, is inapplicable to the deportation context where the petitioner has had no prior
judicial review whatsoever.
260. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88 (1977); cf. LaDuke v. Nelson. 762 F.2d 1318, 1324-25
(9th Cir. 1985) (arguing that the prudential limitations on federal injunctive relief interfering with state law
enforcement and criminal justice institutions do not apply to federal injunctive relief against federal
immigration officials). Similarly, the Court's refusal to review child custody determinations on federal
habeas-notwithstanding evidence that such determinations were reviewable at common law-was based
on concerns about federalism that are wholly inapplicable to the immigration context. See Lehman v.
Lycoming County Children's Serv. Agency, 458 U.S. 502. 514 (1982) ([Rehlianc on what may be
appropriate within the federal system or within a state system is of little force where--as in this case--a
state judgment is attacked collaterally in a federal court."). Review of deportation does not involve the
"relitigation of a final state-court judgment," id. at 512, but rather review of a nonjudicial determination
by a coordinate federal branch.
261. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.").
262. Bator, supra note 50, at 462.
263. Notably, Professor Bator himself has argued that an Article III court should have ultimate power
to control the legality and constitutionality of agency adjudication. See Paul M. Bator. The Constitution as
Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under Article III. 65 lND. LJ. 233. 267-68 (1990).
264. See Yackle, supra note 223, at 1019 (arguing that habeas ought to guarantee a federal forum to
those claiming federal rights).
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appeal before a judicial organ; it is another thing altogether when one may
appeal only to an administrative body, such as the BIA, which the Attorney
General may overrule.265 In short, reviewability of deportation orders before
an Article I court implicates the "institutional" and "functional" role of
habeas260-to ensure the separation of powers and to protect against arbitrary
enforcement of the law by the executive.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note has challenged long-established assumptions about the writ of
habeas corpus. It demonstrates that the common law writ of habeas corpus,
which the Supreme Court has consistently described as an authoritative guide
to interpreting the Suspension Clause, not only applies to aliens facing
deportation, but also supports a broad scope of review. At a time when
immigrants in the United States face an angry backlash intent on reducing their
access to the federal courts, they may turn to one of the oldest and most
exalted forms of action in the common law tradition. While the Court has
always paid homage to the Great Writ, it can now fully recognize the common
law writ's core value and purpose by declaring unconstitutional the judicial
review provisions of the 1996 immigration acts, should they be construed to
limit review solely to constitutional claims.
265. See supra notes 216-222 and accompanying text (discussing the authority of the Attorney General
to overrule the BIA).
266. Bator, supra note 50, at 448-49.
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